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ABSTRACT 
  This Article examines the methods of statutory interpretation used 
by the lower federal courts, especially the federal district courts, and 
compares those methods to the practices of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
This novel research reveals both similarities across courts and some 
striking differences. The research shows that some interpretive tools are 
highly overrepresented in the Supreme Court’s decisions, while other 
tools are much more prevalent in the lower courts. Differences in 
prevalence persist even after accounting for the selection effect that 
stems from the Supreme Court’s discretionary docket. Another 
finding—based on a study of 40 years of cases from all three levels of 
the federal judiciary—is that all federal courts have shifted toward 
more frequent use of textualist tools in recent decades. However, that 
shift has been less pronounced as one moves down the judicial 
hierarchy. 
  The divergence between the interpretive practices of different federal 
courts has implications for both descriptive and normative accounts of 
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statutory interpretation. On the descriptive side, most beliefs about 
statutory interpretation are based on the narrow and unrepresentative 
slice of judicial business conducted in the Supreme Court, but some of 
those beliefs turn out to be incorrect or incomplete as descriptions of 
statutory interpretation more generally. This research therefore 
substantially improves our understanding of the complex reality of 
judicial statutory interpretation. On the normative side, the results of 
this research can advance scholarly and judicial debates over whether 
lower courts should conduct statutory interpretation differently than 
the Supreme Court and whether the Court’s interpretive methodology 
should be binding on lower courts. This Article’s findings also suggest 
that the teaching of statutory interpretation should take into account the 
distinctive practices of the lower courts, where the vast majority of legal 
work is done. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholarship on statutory interpretation has traditionally focused 
on the U.S. Supreme Court. This narrow view is unfortunate because 
the Court’s docket is a tiny and unrepresentative slice of the business 
of the federal courts, not to mention the business of the broader 
dispute-resolution system that includes state courts, administrative 
agencies, prosecutors, and private actors. The Court’s atypicality 
threatens the relevance of normative theory that takes the Court as its 
model or its intended target. Worse still is the risk that scholars and 
litigators will embrace a distorted view of how statutory interpretation 
is conducted. It is therefore a positive development that several 
scholars have in recent years turned their attention to the interpretive 
practices of other courts, in particular the federal courts of appeals and 
several state supreme courts.1 
Nonetheless, our nascent knowledge of the lower courts’ practices 
remains dwarfed by our ignorance. The most important gap in our 
knowledge concerns the federal district courts. Their interpretive 
practices have not been studied in any systematic way, though there 
have been a few limited studies on topics such as district courts’ 
interpretation of the tax code or other specific kinds of statutes.2 This 
 
 1. On the federal courts of appeals, see generally FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 180–200 (2008); James J. Brudney & Lawrence 
Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation in the Courts of Appeals, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681 
(2017) [hereinafter Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation]; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules 
of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481 (2015); and Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. 
Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts 
of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (2018). For an examination of several state supreme courts, 
see generally Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges 
Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 33–81 (1994) (consumer cases in state and 
lower federal courts); Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory 
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Article surveys the previously hidden bulk of the iceberg by studying 
the interpretive practices of the lower federal courts, with a particular 
emphasis on the district courts. This Article also compares those 
practices to the practices of the Supreme Court. 
There is good reason to suspect that statutory interpretation in the 
lower courts would be different than interpretation in the Supreme 
Court. In the busy lower courts, especially in the district courts, one 
would expect terse applications of precedent and plain language to be 
the rule, rather than the lengthy explorations of competing canons and 
obscure sources that are the usual stuff of the Supreme Court’s 
opinions. For a hint of the kind of divergences that systematic study 
might reveal, consider the paths of what are arguably the four most 
notable Supreme Court statutory-interpretation cases of the last five 
years: King v. Burwell,3 the Affordable Care Act subsidies case; Yates 
v. United States,4 the undersized-fish case; Bond v. United States,5 the 
case of adultery and a chemically burned thumb; and Lockhart v. 
United States,6 a sentencing case that was watched closely by 
interpretation mavens.7 In two of these four blockbusters-to-be, 
namely Lockhart and Bond, there was no written opinion in the district 
court, only an oral ruling from the bench. In the Supreme Court, 
Lockhart generated dueling opinions from Justices Sotomayor and 
Kagan, both of whom wielded grammar canons, statutory structure, 
legislative history, and the rule of lenity. The district judge, by contrast, 
had made short work of the issue that would vex the Justices, rejecting 
the defendant’s argument about the statute’s coverage by stating 
during a hearing, “I’m ruling that the plain reading of the statute 
 
Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 338–51 (2001) (federal tax cases in 
district courts).  
 3. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 4. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
 5. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 6. Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016). 
 7. These are the four Supreme Court cases set out as principal cases in the statutory-
interpretation chapters of the 2016 supplement to what is generally regarded as the leading book 
in the field, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., JAMES J. BRUDNEY & JOSH CHAFETZ, 2016 
SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND 
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY vi (2016). All four of these cases have generated significant 
scholarly and blogospheric commentary. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 
GREEN BAG 2D 407 (2015) (discussing King, Yates, and Bond); Asher Steinberg, Lockhart v. 
United States—Argument Recap, and Ruminations on Canon Entrepreneurship, Legal 
Indeterminacy, and Legislative History, THE NARROWEST GROUNDS (Nov. 7, 2015, 1:16 PM), 
http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2015/11/lockhart-v-united-states-argument-recap.html 
[https://perma.cc/TVC9-C63P]. 
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negates [the defendant’s] position.”8 The district judge in Bond, who 
likewise ruled from the bench, did not even address the federalism-
tinged version of the canon of constitutional avoidance that the 
Supreme Court would later use to justify its narrow construction of the 
federal chemical-weapons statute.9 
Unlike those two cases, Yates did generate a written opinion in the 
district court, albeit a brief one. Mr. Yates, a fisherman charged with 
destruction of evidence by throwing fish overboard, moved for 
acquittal on the ground that the statute at issue reached only the 
destruction of things like documents, not the undersized fish he had 
caught.10 The district court disagreed in a single paragraph.11 The 
opinion relied on circuit precedent showing that the statute swept more 
broadly than the document-shredding scenarios that Congress seemed 
to have had in mind.12 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of the 
statute’s application to fish was limited to one paragraph that relied on 
what it regarded as the unambiguous ordinary meaning of the statutory 
phrase “tangible object.”13 That paragraph cited a dictionary definition 
of “tangible” but did not discuss the various linguistic canons and 
legislative intent arguments that would so occupy the Supreme Court.14 
The outlier of the four cases is King, as the interpretive work in 
that case looked roughly similar at every level of the system. It was 
clear from the start that the legality of the Affordable Care Act’s 
subsidies would, through one case or another, soon reach the Supreme 
Court. Starting in the district court, the briefing in King was expert and 
extensive, with the challengers already being represented by the 
appellate specialist who would later represent them in the Supreme 
Court.15 Several amicus briefs were filed even in the district court.16 The 
district court issued an opinion headed for publication in the Federal 
 
 8. Transcript of Sentencing, United States v. Lockhart, No. 11-CR-231 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 
2013), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 43–45, Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. 958 (No. 14-8358), 2015 WL 
4550240. 
 9. Motions Hearing, United States v. Bond, No. 07-CR-528 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2007), 
reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App-26, Bond, 564 U.S. 211 (No. 09-1227), 2010 WL 
1506717. 
 10. United States v. Yates, No. 2:10-CR-66-FTM-29SPC, 2011 WL 3444093, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 
Aug. 8, 2011) (citing United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 744 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059, 1064 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 14. Id. 
 15. King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415, 418 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
 16. Docket Sheet, King, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415 (No. 13-CV-006300-JRS). 
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Supplement 2d, itself a rare event, and upheld the subsidies in a 
thorough opinion that addressed the Chevron17 deference doctrine, 
“whole-act” arguments, the superfluity canon, a federalism clear-
statement rule, legislative history, and Congressional Budget Office 
analyses.18 The court of appeals used most of the same tools and upheld 
the Government’s position under Chevron.19 The Supreme Court also 
ultimately upheld the Affordable Care Act subsidies.20 Probably the 
most striking difference between the Supreme Court’s opinion and 
those that preceded it involved the role of Chevron deference, which 
the lower courts employed but the Supreme Court pointedly did not 
apply.21 
Four cases amount to no more than anecdote, but the much larger 
study undertaken for this Article shows that divergence between the 
interpretive practices of the Supreme Court and the lower courts is real 
and systematic. I examined the use of over 20 interpretive tools at each 
level of the federal judiciary. For some particularly important tools, I 
examined a period of 40 years. The rest of the tools were studied across 
a decade. I also scrutinized in greater depth the last five years of 
Supreme Court decisions together with the opinions of the district 
courts and courts of appeals in those same cases. No remotely 
comparable study of the district courts’ interpretive practices has been 
undertaken before. This study also substantially extends the modest 
existing research on the courts of appeals and, to allow comparisons 
across tiers of the judiciary, conducts novel research on the Supreme 
Court as well. 
To preview, one overarching finding of this Article is that courts 
at different levels of the system are both doing different things and 
doing things differently. That is, the lower courts spend only a small 
part of their time resolving the difficult interpretive questions that 
make up much of the Supreme Court’s docket. But even when the 
lower courts do confront those same questions, the lower courts’ 
practices meaningfully diverge from the Supreme Court’s practices. 
There are also several subsidiary findings that engage with important 
debates in the literature. These include the following results: 
First, although the lower courts and the Supreme Court all shifted 
 
 17. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 18. King, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 426–32. 
 19. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 376 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 20. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 21. Id. at 2489. 
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toward textualist tools starting in the late-1980s, the change was 
dampened and less transformative at each step further down the 
judicial hierarchy. 
Second, there are significant differences across the judicial 
hierarchy in the frequency with which interpretive tools are used. 
Almost every interpretive canon or source, except for precedent, is 
used much less in lower courts, but that effect does not apply to all tools 
equally. For example, some canons are “top-heavy”—that is, highly 
overrepresented in the Supreme Court. Other tools are relatively more 
common further down the hierarchy, making those tools “bottom-
heavy.” Legislative history is commonly used at all levels, but courts 
differ in which kinds of legislative history they use, with the lower 
courts heavily emphasizing the most accessible and authoritative kinds. 
Third, the results reveal another form of unpredictability in 
statutory interpretation. Even within a single case, different 
interpretive canons are used as the case moves through the judicial 
system. There are many cases in which the Supreme Court’s analytical 
tools did not appear at all in the opinions of the court of appeals or the 
district court. 
Fourth, some canons display lifecycles in which they are initially 
prominent in the Supreme Court and then gradually spread through 
the rest of the system. This pattern characterizes the federalism canons 
of the Rehnquist era, for example. 
In light of the findings just summarized, one can fairly conclude 
that the tip of the iceberg is not representative of the whole. This 
divergence between the interpretive practices of different federal 
courts has implications for both the descriptive and the normative 
literatures on statutory interpretation. On the descriptive side, many 
beliefs and assumptions that correctly describe the Supreme Court’s 
practices are wrong or incomplete as a description of the rest of the 
system. On the normative side, there is a growing literature on whether 
lower federal courts and state courts should do statutory interpretation 
differently than the Supreme Court.22 Normative prescriptions should 
 
 22. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute 
in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012) (arguing that statutory interpretation should 
differ across courts according to each court’s particular institutional circumstances); Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1215 (2012) (proposing that statutory interpretation should differ depending on whether a judge 
is elected or appointed); Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 777 (2017) (arguing that only the Supreme Court should apply the “major 
questions exception” to the Chevron doctrine, see supra note 17 and accompanying text); Ethan 
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proceed from a robust account of actual practices, especially where 
those practices are driven by relatively fixed institutional constraints.23 
A better understanding of the lower courts’ practices may alter 
normative prescriptions or at least allow for the gap between 
prescription and reality to be more accurately measured. 
This Article’s findings also have practical implications for the 
teaching of statutory interpretation in law schools. The Supreme Court 
will, and probably should, remain the focus of statutory-interpretation 
pedagogy. Its decisions offer the richest debates, and its work serves as 
a model and guide for other courts. Old favorites like Holy Trinity24 
and new classics like King v. Burwell25 provide a vocabulary that 
lawyers should know. But teaching students that the lower courts are 
different is necessary to ensure that students are well prepared to 
practice in the courts in which virtually all students will spend much 
more time than they will spend litigating in the Supreme Court. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I uses existing 
understandings of judicial institutions and judicial behavior to explain 
why the interpretive practices of the lower courts, especially the district 
courts, can be expected to diverge from the practices of the Supreme 
Court. Setting out these expectations is important because it can direct 
the investigation of the lower courts’ practices—a potentially massive 
topic—toward particular hypotheses and key questions. 
Part II presents the findings and reaches generalizations about 
lower-court interpretation. There is no single right methodology for 
studying interpretive approaches, but a sound strategy is to use 
multiple techniques, acknowledge their strengths and weaknesses, and 
put the most confidence in results that persist across techniques. This 
Article uses several distinct techniques. One approach is to examine 
 
Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 910–929 (2013) (arguing that local 
judges should have discretion in interpreting local laws and ambiguous state statutes); Jeffrey A. 
Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479 (2013) (arguing that state 
courts with common-law powers should interpret statutes differently than federal courts). 
 23. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 81, 96 (2017) (observing that “[r]ules of interpretation must reflect the resources available 
to the task”); see also KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 
13–16 (2013) (emphasizing the importance of combining conceptual insights and institutional 
realities); infra Part I.B.1 (describing institutional factors like caseloads and resource disparities). 
See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 885 (2003) (arguing that an institution’s interpretive approach should reflect its capacities 
and role). 
 24. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 25. 135 S. Ct. 2480. 
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the rates and ratios at which various tools are used in different courts. 
This comparison reveals which interpretive tools are the most 
overrepresented and underrepresented in the lower courts as 
compared to the Supreme Court. This Article also uses a “matched-
corpus method” in which a smaller group of cases is closely examined 
at all three levels of the federal judicial system. This method shows that 
interpretive differences across courts persist even within a single case 
with a fixed set of facts and statutory provisions. Part II also tracks 
several especially important tools over several decades to see how their 
use has evolved at different levels of the judiciary. Finally, Part II 
explains how the findings require reassessment of some conventional 
truths found in the Supreme Court–oriented literature. 
This Article concludes with recommendations for future lines of 
normative and descriptive scholarship, suggestions for courts and 
attorneys about how they might respond to interpretive divergence, 
and a call for instructors to reorient their pedagogical priorities. 
I.  WHAT LOWER-COURT INTERPRETATION SHOULD LOOK LIKE: 
TENTATIVE HYPOTHESES AND KEY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
The goal of this research, stated in broad terms, is to determine 
whether and in what respects the interpretive practices of the lower 
courts, especially the federal district courts, differ from the practices of 
the U.S. Supreme Court.26 This topic is broad, but the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature, together with knowledge of the 
institutional features of the courts, can identify subjects of particular 
importance and suggest tentative hypotheses to investigate. 
Accordingly, this Part generates some predictions and identifies some 
key questions about lower-court interpretation. The first step in that 
effort is to explain why a degree of interpretive divergence across 
 
 26. This Article does not explore methodological divergences between different courts at 
the same level of the system, such as different circuits or different federal districts. Different 
circuits and districts have somewhat different case mixes, which make different canons and tools 
more or less relevant to their work. Beyond that, the uneven timing of judicial retirements means 
that presidents will make their mark on some courts faster and more deeply than on others, 
leading to temporary ideologically generated differences. And purely by happenstance, an 
entrepreneurial judge or two can create a distinctive local interpretive culture. Cf. Brudney & 
Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 726–27 (conjecturing that the antipathy 
to dictionaries of Judges Easterbrook and Posner may explain the low rate of dictionary use on 
the Seventh Circuit). Nor does this study examine judge-level characteristics, such as age, party 
of appointing president, and pre-appointment career. Some of the variables discussed in this 
footnote could well be expected to influence interpretive methods, but the investigation here is 
limited to the differences across tiers of the judiciary.  
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courts is possible. 
A. The Opportunity for Divergence and Limits on It 
There are limits on the amount of divergence in interpretive 
practices that one could reasonably expect to see from courts within 
the same hierarchy. This is so for several reasons. To begin with, to the 
extent that methodological choices drive bottom-line results, a 
hierarchical judicial system could not tolerate interpretive differences 
so vast that they routinely led to reversals on appeal. That would be 
the equivalent of a factory in which the workers on the assembly line 
paint widgets red, only to have the quality-control inspectors at the end 
of the line repaint them all green. Further, at least some lower-court 
judges regard certain aspects of interpretive methodology as being 
subject to the Supreme Court’s direction.27 Perhaps more important 
than any formal supervisory control, however, is the fact that members 
of the federal judiciary are engaged in a shared enterprise, with the 
Supreme Court providing the leading example of their common craft.28 
Finally, judges and the attorneys who argue before them are all 
exposed to the broader legal culture’s intellectual currents, such as the 
shift toward textualism and interpretive formalism that has occurred in 
recent decades.29 All of those forces push courts toward conformity. 
Nonetheless, several countervailing factors allow and even 
encourage interpretive divergence. First, although some fundamentals 
of interpretation are widely embraced—for example, that the text is 
ordinarily the most important consideration—there is no consensus on 
a single “right way” to do statutory interpretation.30 No court, and not 
 
 27. See generally Gluck & Posner, supra note 1, at 1331–32, 1343–46 (reporting that most of 
the judges in their survey did not believe the Supreme Court’s methods were binding, though the 
judges made exceptions for Chevron and some substantive canons); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
What Would It Mean to Have Methodological Stare Decisis (and Do We Already Have It)? 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (showing that there is more evidence of 
methodological stare decisis than has generally been appreciated). 
 28. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 97–104, 112–14 (2006); see also 
THE SUPREME COURT’S STYLE GUIDE iii (Jack Metzler ed. 2016) (writing that the Court’s 
opinions “are natural exemplars for judges of other courts and for lawyers who seek to improve 
by emulating the very best the legal profession has to offer”). 
 29. See Paul Clement, Editorial, Arguing Before Justice Scalia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2016 
(describing Justice Scalia’s influence on interpretive advocacy); Marty Lederman, Textualism? 
Purposivism? The Chief Justice Comes Down on the Side of Interpretive Pragmatism, SLATE (June 
25, 2015, 4: 26 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/
features/2015/scotus_roundup/supreme_court_2015_john_roberts_ruling_in_king_v_burwell.ht
ml[https://perma.cc/5NJ9-Y2UT] (similar). 
 30. GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 43; Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation, 
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even any single judge, is completely consistent in interpretive approach 
from case to case. When appellate courts are themselves impure and 
inconsistent, it is hard for them to impose interpretive discipline on 
lower courts; it is likewise hard for those lower courts to know what 
rules they are supposed to follow, assuming obedience is even their 
goal. 
Second, even where interpretive doctrines are widely embraced, 
the doctrines often take the form of fuzzy standards or factors of 
indeterminate weight. For example, many canons take the form of 
presumptions that are rebuttable by “enough” contrary evidence, and 
many doctrines apply only when the text is “ambiguous.”31 Such 
doctrines allow reasonably divergent applications, and noncompliance 
is hard to detect.32 
Third, the potential enforcers of uniformity in interpretation have 
relatively weak incentives to do so. Litigants—that is, potential 
appellants and petitioners—are understandably focused on who wins, 
not which interpretive tools were used to get to the bottom line. The 
Supreme Court’s concern is admittedly broader; the Court cares not so 
much about specific case outcomes as about whether lower courts are 
giving a statute a consistent meaning.33 However, the link between 
interpretive methods and interpretive outputs is loose enough34 that 
policing methodology per se is not an immediate imperative for the 
Court. Would the Court grant certiorari on a statutory question of no 
great policy significance that the lower courts had all decided the same 
way, just so that the Court could repudiate a lower court’s 
methodology while affirming the ultimate holding? Similarly, would 
the Court fail to grant certiorari on an otherwise cert-worthy circuit 
split, just because the lower courts had all used the same method, even 
the “correct” method? In both cases the answer is almost certainly no. 
Fourth, interpretive methodology is not regarded as binding to the 
same extent that precedents normally bind.35 Thus, even if reviewing 
 
supra note 1, at 691. 
 31. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2135–
38 (2016) (book review). 
 32. See Frank Cross, Tonja Jacobi & Emerson Tiller, A Positive Political Theory of Rules 
and Standards, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 14–18 (2012). 
 33. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1630–39 (2008). 
 34. See Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 692; Jason J. 
Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal 
Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 882 (2006).  
 35. Gluck & Posner, supra note 1, at 1343–44; Bruhl, supra note 27. 
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courts themselves regularized their practices and purported to issue 
binding methodological edicts, it is not clear that lower courts would 
be legally required to obey them. 
B. Causes of Divergence and Which Divergences They Encourage 
For the reasons just set out, there is room for interpretive 
divergence across the tiers of the judiciary, albeit within limits. More 
than that, there are affirmative reasons to expect divergence and to 
expect it to take particular forms. We can divide the factors that 
encourage methodological divergence into a few categories: 
differences in institutional context, differences in judicial preferences, 
and time-lag effects. The following subsections elaborate on these 
drivers of divergence and explain how they might influence 
interpretive practices. 
1. Institutional Context and Capacity.  Courts are decision-making 
systems composed not just of judges, but also of court staff, attorneys, 
and others. These actors interact within structures and informational 
architectures that vary from court to court. We can expect divergences 
in interpretive methods to arise from the institutional differences 
between courts at different levels of the federal system. This is a large 
category of influences that naturally divides into a few subcategories. 
a. Resources.  The resources available for making legal decisions 
are abundant at the top of the judicial system and decrease as one 
moves down the pyramid. The Supreme Court’s oral-argument docket 
has recently consisted of only around 70 cases per year.36 Each of those 
cases receives the attention of nine experienced judges, each of whom 
is assisted by resourceful librarians and several highly capable clerks. 
The briefing and arguments before the Court are increasingly 
presented by Supreme Court experts.37 Almost every case attracts 
amicus briefs that present additional arguments, information, and 
perspectives.38 When the United States is not a party, the Solicitor 
 
 36. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.A-1 (2017) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2017-tables [https://perma.cc/DT8T-
ARD9]. 
 37. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: 
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1557 (2008). 
 38. Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1902–
04 (2016); Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, In Unusual Term, Big Year for Amicus 
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General frequently files amicus briefs that are prized for their 
deliberation and evenhandedness.39 This is a resource-rich 
environment, inside and out, and that richness shows itself in the 
Court’s work product; the decisions are usually lengthy and full of 
interpretive thrusts and parries, and they often feature multiple 
opinions sparring over the key points.40 
The decision-making environment is less favorable in the courts of 
appeals. The caseload is much higher, so the amount of time available 
for each case is tightly constricted.41 Most cases do not get oral 
argument but are instead decided only on the briefs, often with 
minimal collegial deliberation.42 The quality of briefing is lower on 
average.43 The parties often fail to make the right arguments and 
present the best information, but the cases must be decided anyway 
because jurisdiction is almost entirely mandatory.44 Amicus briefs, 
which might fill the gaps in the parties’ presentations, are uncommon.45 
Even a judge as able as Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit 
admits feeling pushed to the edge of his competence.46 
 
Curiae at the Supreme Court, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 21, 2016).  
 39. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing 
Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1353–60 (2010) (providing statistics on 
the Solicitor General’s participation). 
 40. See LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE 
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISION, AND DEVELOPMENTS 252–57 tbl.3-2, 258–63 
tbl.3-3, 264–65 tbl.3-4 (6th ed. 2015) (reporting data on the number and length of opinions). 
 41. See BRYAN A. GARNER, CARLOS BEA, REBECCA WHITE BERCH, NEIL M. GORSUCH, 
HARRIS L. HARTZ, NATHAN L. HECHT, BRETT M. KAVANAUGH, ALEX KOZINSKI, SANDRA L. 
LYNCH, WILLIAM H. PRYOR, JR., THOMAS M. REAVLEY, JEFFREY S. SUTTON & DIANE P. 
WOOD, THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 257 (2016); Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 95–96. 
 42. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 36, tbl.B-10 (showing that 80 percent of cases before 
the federal courts of appeals were decided without argument). To be sure, not every case requires 
much deliberation; some appeals are near frivolous. Still, capacity constraints are the reason that 
streamlined decision-making practices became so prevalent, so it is reasonable to suppose that in 
a richer environment some of the cases would receive better and more elaborated dispositions. 
See generally WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 83–127 (2012) (describing various efficiency 
measures courts of appeals have adopted in response to docket pressures).  
 43. See, e.g., Interview with Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 145, 
160 (2010) (assessing briefing in the Supreme Court as “pretty uniformly good” and stating that 
“[y]ou’ll get very good briefs in the circuits on a lesser number of occasions”).  
 44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (assigning the courts of appeals mandatory jurisdiction over 
most final decisions of district courts). 
 45. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A 
Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 686–87 (2008).  
 46. See Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 95–97 (describing the common assumption that judges 
have unlimited time to deliberate as “a bunch of baloney!”). 
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The environment for legal decision-making is least favorable of all 
in the busy and often understaffed district courts. A district judge’s 
attention cannot focus primarily on legal questions but must also be 
devoted to other important duties like managing the case, overseeing 
discovery, and facilitating settlement.47 District courts are not collegial 
courts, so legal rulings are made without the benefit of other judges 
who may have different perspectives, offer new arguments, or point out 
weaknesses in tentative positions.48 District judges generally have 
fewer law clerks than appellate judges.49 The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which govern practice in the district courts, do not even 
expressly provide for amicus briefs, though they are filed on rare 
occasions.50 Most district judges are highly competent, but shortcuts 
and errors are to be expected. Consider the recent remarks of District 
Judge Jed Rakoff, who is nobody’s idea of a slouch: 
[A] district judge doesn’t have the luxury to treat every case and every 
issue with the total attention it might theoretically deserve. District 
judges’ busy dockets demand they get on with the job, and that often 
requires arriving at a tentative “common sense” solution to the 
underlying dispute presented by a case before they have had a chance 
to fully plumb every legal nicety.51 
The statutory-interpretive consequences of the resource disparities just 
described will be fleshed out below, but the short of it is that 
constrained decision-making environments can be expected to lead to 
simpler and quicker interpretive approaches. 
b. Differences in Docket Composition.  Courts at different levels 
of the system confront different kinds of cases and issues. 
Difficulty of cases. To start with, the legal questions addressed by 
the Supreme Court are typically harder than the legal questions 
 
 47. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1991). 
 48. See id. at 232 (observing that courts of appeals, unlike district courts, “employ multijudge 
panels . . . that permit reflective dialogue and collective judgment”). 
 49. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 235 (2013); 
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 66 
(Sept. 1991). 
 50. E.g., Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 557 F. Supp. 2d 131, 136–37 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 51. Joel Cohen, Richard A. Posner & Jed S. Rakoff, Should a Judge Rely on the Law or His 
Own Common Sense?, SLATE (Sept. 18, 2017, 11:04 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/09/should_a_judge_rely_on_the_law_or_his_own_commo
n_sense.html [https://perma.cc/P3LZ-TWTV]. 
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answered by the lower courts.52 Harder, for these purposes, means that 
the most authoritative legal sources are underdeterminate. Cases 
generally do not reach the Court when they are obviously resolved by 
precedent or clear text.53 That means that the Court routinely needs to 
bring to bear a variety of tools, or rely on debatable applications of 
tools, in order to discern or construct statutory meaning. Because the 
decisions are debatable, there are often separate opinions. A 
concurrence or dissent might introduce countervailing tools or 
canons—for example, a substantive canon or legislative history to 
rebut a whole-code linguistic inference. As a result, a Supreme Court 
opinion is often an elaborate confection featuring many tools 
intensively used. 
District courts certainly do difficult work, and lots of it, but hard 
legal questions are unusual.54 Most of the legal questions they 
encounter are settled by precedent or controlled by unambiguous text. 
Even in the courts of appeals, where the easiest cases will never make 
it, the vast majority of decisions are unpublished because the judges 
regard them as making no contribution to the law.55 Most cases in the 
district courts also have little ideological significance, which means 
there is little reason to evade what appear to be straightforward 
answers.56 The application of a state’s comparative negligence statute 
to a car crash is less likely to stir up a judge’s personal political leanings 
than a question about the intersection of antidiscrimination statutes 
and religious freedoms. For these reasons, even if the lower courts had 
time for exhaustive analysis and explanation in every case, which they 
do not, there would often be no need for it. 
Different mix of cases and legal issues. Different federal courts 
encounter a different mix of topics and, within a given case, address 
different kinds of issues. The following are a few such differences that 
 
 52. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 234–235. 
 53. Cf. Sup. Ct. R. 10 (listing conflict between lower courts as a reason for granting review). 
 54. See JON O. NEWMAN, BENCHED: ABORTION, TERRORISTS, DRONES, CROOKS, 
SUPREME COURT, KENNEDY, NIXON, DEMI MOORE, AND OTHER TALES FROM THE LIFE OF A 
FEDERAL JUDGE 251 (2017). 
 55. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 42, tbl.B-12 (providing statistics on publication 
rates). 
 56. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Robert A. Carp & Kenneth L. Manning, Polarization in 
American Politics: Does it Extend to the Federal District Court? 23 (July 21, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007983 [https://perma.cc/9K4S-6DSG] (“It is on the trial 
bench where we might expect that the legal model of judicial behavior—that is, the understanding 
that judges’ decision-making is primarily driven by law, facts, and precedent rather than their own 
personal policy preferences—would be most often manifested.”). 
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are likely to generate some divergences in interpretive practices. 
Unlike the differences above, which mostly affect the amount of canon 
use, this category of differences affects which canons are needed most. 
The modern U.S. Supreme Court almost never decides issues of 
state law, but the lower federal courts routinely do so.57 On the civil 
side of the docket, almost 30 percent of the district courts’ caseload is 
made up of diversity cases.58 As a matter of interpretive theory, it is an 
interesting question whether a federal court’s Erie-based duty to apply 
state law entails a duty to use state interpretive tools and approaches.59 
As a practical matter, however, the lower federal courts often apply 
state “code construction acts,” state versions of familiar canons, and 
even canons that do not have any direct federal analogue.60 The lower 
courts’ diversity docket therefore provides a reason to suspect that 
some tools will appear relatively more often in the lower courts, though 
it is hard to predict which ones. 
Some methodological divergence can be expected to arise from 
the specialized or limited jurisdictions of certain lower courts. For 
example, the Federal Circuit, which hears all veterans’ benefits 
appeals, has a disproportionate opportunity to use the substantive 
canon of construing statutes in favor of the veteran.61 District courts as 
a class have less opportunity to apply agency-deference doctrines 
because many cases reviewing agency action begin directly in the 
courts of appeals, skipping the district courts entirely.62 
Even within the same case, different courts tend to direct their 
interpretive efforts toward different issues. District courts spend a 
greater proportion of their time on jurisdiction, discovery, and other 
 
 57. The Supreme Court does hear cases that were originally filed in the district court under 
diversity jurisdiction, but the modern Court hears those cases only in order to resolve matters of 
federal law that arise along the way, e.g., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 198–
99 (1988), not to decide state-law issues. 
 58. JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 42, tbl.C-4.  
 59. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie 
for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 758, 782–84 (2013) (discussing this question). 
 60. E.g., Antonio v. SSA Sec., Inc., 749 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying Maryland’s 
presumption against the implied repeal of common law); Gold v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 730 F.3d 137, 
143–44 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying New York’s presumption against legislative retroactivity); Miller 
v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 595 F.3d 782, 786–87 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing various Indiana canons 
of construction); Tex. Pharmacy Ass’n v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 105 F.3d 1035, 1039 (5th Cir. 
1997) (applying the Texas Code Construction Act’s rule on severability of invalid statutory 
provisions). 
 61. E.g., Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 62. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2012) (certain orders of the FCC and several other agencies).  
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procedural matters than the Supreme Court does.63 This is not to say 
that the Supreme Court is uninterested in civil procedure or 
jurisdiction—on the contrary, the Roberts Court has recently shown a 
substantial interest64—but almost every case in the lower courts that 
requires judicial action involves decisions on procedural, jurisdictional, 
or evidentiary matters. The Supreme Court generally hears only one 
question in a case, usually a question of substantive law, and the Court 
is almost always free to disregard the procedural or evidentiary matters 
that may have constituted much of the judicial activity below. 
Limitations on federal appellate jurisdiction also cause systematic 
differences in the issues that occupy different courts. For example, 
there is little opportunity for appellate opinions on discovery because 
discovery rulings are usually not immediately appealable, and, if and 
when the time for appeal does come, those rulings often have become 
moot or practically unimportant.65 Similarly, appellate courts have less 
opportunity to address some categories of jurisdictional disputes 
because decisions remanding removed cases to state court for lack of 
federal jurisdiction are generally not appealable.66 This has an 
important impact on the prevalence of interpretive canons across 
courts because there is a substantive canon calling for the strict 
construction of jurisdictional statutes, a canon invoked most often in 
the context of the removal statute.67 District courts have far more 
opportunities to apply this canon than appellate courts. 
c. Role of Precedent.  Precedent plays a different role in different 
courts. Although the Supreme Court frequently cites various sorts of 
precedents in its statutory-interpretive decisions,68 the Court is bound 
only by its own decisions, and it is rare for the Court to exercise its 
 
 63. As compared to courts of appeals cases, the Supreme Court’s opinions are 
underpopulated with words involving procedure and evidence. See Michael A. Livermore, Allen 
B. Riddell & Daniel N. Rockmore, The Supreme Court and the Judicial Genre, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 
837, 872 (2017). One would expect the effect to be even stronger in the district courts. See 
generally Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Horizontal Procedure (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (describing the preeminence of district courts in generating caselaw on matters of 
procedure, especially on matters of discovery and case management).  
 64. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. 
LITIG. 313, 313–14 (2012). 
 65. THOMAS A. MAUET & DAVID MARCUS, PRETRIAL § 6.1 at 195 (9th ed. 2015).  
 66. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (making an exception for certain large 
class actions). 
 67. See Bruhl, supra note 1, at 506–08. 
 68. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical 
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1093 (1992). 
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discretionary jurisdiction to hear a case that is squarely resolved by its 
prior holdings.69 Precedent is much thicker and more constraining in 
the lower courts, as not just Supreme Court precedents but also circuit 
precedents are binding on the issuing circuit and its district courts. 
Therefore, one often sees lower courts decide cases through the routine 
application of local precedent even when the issue is so unsettled at the 
national level that it later results in a Supreme Court decision. For 
example, in McNeill v. United States,70 the Supreme Court resolved a 
circuit split over the Armed Career Criminal Act by using plain 
meaning, the whole-act rule, and the absurd-results doctrine.71 The 
district court in the same case had written an unpublished opinion that 
relied, for the relevant point, on an unpublished (and therefore 
nonbinding) circuit decision.72 Similarly, the question that divided the 
Supreme Court 5 to 4 in Dorsey v. United States,73 was considered so 
settled that the district judge stated from the bench, “I have ruled on 
this many times before so I won’t be spending a lot of time nor asking 
[the prosecutor or defense attorney] to respond [to the ruling].”74 The 
overwhelming importance of precedent in the lower courts today, 
combined with the rarity of cases of first impression, has left all other 
interpretive tools—for example, textual and substantive canons, 
dictionaries, and legislative debates—with less of a role to play. 
The nature of the hierarchical system also makes it more 
important for the Supreme Court to get its few but highly 
consequential decisions right. There is no further reviewing court to 
correct the Court’s errors, and congressional overrides of Supreme 
Court decisions are difficult and increasingly rare.75 The legal 
interpretations of the district courts, by contrast, are highly provisional 
 
 69. The Court can of course overrule its precedents, but stare decisis has particular force in 
statutory cases. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015). 
 70. McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011). 
 71. Id. at 821–22. 
 72. United States v. McNeill, No. 5:08-CR-2-D-1 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2009), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 131062 at *13. 
 73. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012). 
 74. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, United States v. Dorsey, No. 09-20003 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 
10, 2010), reprinted in Joint Appendix at *69, Dorsey v. United States, No. 11-5683 (Jan. 25, 2012), 
2012 WL 608393.  
 75. There is disagreement over how to define overrides and when the decline started, but 
there is agreement that overrides have sharply declined. See Richard L. Hasen, End of the 
Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209, 
218 (2013); Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1332–33 
(2014). 
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and so, even if there were enough time to do so, it might not make sense 
for the district courts to turn over every stone to find what looks like 
the best decision in a close case. Still, it is bracing to see, in an official 
publication of the Federal Judicial Center, newly appointed district 
judges being given the following advice about how to approach cases 
in which the law is unsettled or nonexistent: 
Do not worry about whether you may be reversed. No judge has been 
impeached for having been reversed. Get on with the opinion and do 
the best you can. The court of appeals or the Supreme Court is going 
to have the last word anyhow.76 
The courts of appeals are indeed often the last word, but even 
there one sometimes observes judges stating that they need not do their 
all to get a case right. In particular, judges sometimes argue against 
rehearing a case en banc, which would allow them to reexamine 
questionable circuit precedent, because the issue is one that the 
Supreme Court could be reasonably expected to resolve in the near 
future anyway.77 
d. Executive Advice.  Another potentially relevant difference 
across judicial tiers is that the Supreme Court gets more input from the 
executive branch on how to decide cases. When the United States is 
not a party to a Supreme Court case, the government often submits an 
amicus brief, especially when the interpretation of a federal statute is 
at issue.78 At a minimum, these briefs provide helpful information to 
the Court. More than that, the briefs can present an administrative 
agency’s official interpretation, not previously announced, that can 
then warrant deference from the Court under the Skidmore79 and 
Auer/Seminole Rock80 doctrines.81 Agency amicus briefs are rare in the 
lower courts, especially in the district courts.82 The lower courts 
 
 76. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGES 209 (6th ed. 2013). 
 77. E.g., NEWMAN, supra note 54, at 165. 
 78. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 39, at 1353–60 (describing the Solicitor General’s 
amicus activity). 
 79. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944). 
 80. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 
410, 414 (1945).  
 81. E.g., Auer, 519 U.S. at 461–62 (deferring to the interpretation of a regulation advanced 
in the government’s amicus brief).  
 82. See, e.g., Dekeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca Inc., No. 08-C-488, 2009 WL 5214418, at 
*1 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 28, 2009) (denying a party’s motion to invite an agency to submit a brief); 
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therefore have fewer occasions to use the doctrines, so prevalent in the 
Supreme Court, that govern deference to agency interpretations 
presented in briefs.83 
2. Ideological Differences.  Judges have policy preferences, and 
these preferences express themselves in statutory cases as in other 
domains.84 The effects of judicial ideologies can be expected to play out 
somewhat differently at different levels of the judicial system. 
To begin with, Supreme Court cases are generally high stakes and 
difficult—that is, least constrained by authoritative legal materials85—
so there is more motive and opportunity for ideology to operate at the 
Supreme Court level. What this means for interpretive methods is not 
entirely clear. It probably means that canons and other tools play less 
of a role in determining outcomes than they do in lower courts, even if 
the Court’s opinions make fulsome use of them. At the same time, it 
could be that the public scrutiny trained on the Court makes the 
Justices sensitive to charges of activism and could encourage them to 
adopt at least a pose of restraint. The desire to avoid charges of 
activism has been put forward as a potential explanation for the Court’s 
unusually firm embrace of the purportedly neutral guidance offered by 
dictionaries.86 
In terms of the content of judicial preferences, it is possible for 
different courts to fall at different places on the ideological spectrum. 
This can have methodological consequences because some aspects of 
the familiar left–right divide have predictable associations with views 
about particular interpretive canons, such as conservatism being 
associated with canons protecting sovereign immunity and disfavoring 
extraterritorial application of federal law.87 We might, therefore, 
 
Burgess v. Garvin, No. 01 CIV. 10994 (GEL), 2004 WL 527053, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2004) 
(noting that the government declined the court’s invitation to file an amicus brief). 
 83. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1098–99, 1111–15 (2008) (documenting the role of government amicus briefs as sources of 
interpretations in the Supreme Court). 
 84. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE 
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 24–40 (2006) 
(showing the effect of ideology in several statutory fields).  
 85. See supra Part I.B.1.b (describing differences in case difficulty across tiers of the 
judiciary). 
 86. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for 
Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 499–500 (2013). 
 87. For example, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), Justice 
Marshall’s dissent for the three most liberal Justices criticized the majority for strengthening the 
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expect conservative-leaning courts to favor different canons than 
liberal-leaning courts. To be sure, the ideological differences across 
tiers could not be too large without leading to unsustainable conflict, 
and a president generally appoints like-minded judges to all levels of 
the judiciary. But there is some slack in the system due to factors like 
home-state senators’ influence and lumpiness in the timing of 
retirements and replacements across different courts.88 
There are other preferences—not ideological in the familiar left–
right sense—that can be expected to vary systematically across courts. 
These preferences include, notably, institutionally oriented 
preferences about how the judicial system operates. For example, busy 
lower-court judges might favor canons that restrict their jurisdiction.89 
3. Lag Effects.  The Supreme Court sometimes changes the rules 
of statutory interpretation.90 Unless a change is instantly transmitted 
through the rest of the system, there will be a lag that creates at least a 
temporary divergence between different courts. 
Consider the situation in which the Supreme Court stops using a 
canon. If the Court expressly repudiates the canon, one would expect 
the lower courts to catch on soon enough. If instead the Court simply 
stops using a canon even when the canon seems applicable, a faithful 
lower court might be unsure how to respond. Given uncertainty over 
the Court’s reasons, and habit being a powerful force, the lower courts 
might be expected to continue using canons that have largely 
disappeared from the U.S. Reports. In prior work, I identified several 
canons that appear to be in this state of limbo, abandoned by the 
 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 261–62 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 88. See generally Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The 
Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007) (comparing ideology scores of the 
Supreme Court and each federal court of appeals); Federal District Court Judge Ideology Data, 
CHRISTINA L. BOYD (2015) http://clboyd.net/ideology.html [https://perma.cc/CRY4-Z5VK] 
(providing similar data for district judges). 
 89. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Jurisdiction Canon, 70 VAND. L. REV. 499, 553–55 
(2017). 
 90. See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 1, at 494–546 (discussing how lower courts respond when the 
Supreme Court changes the interpretive regime); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
593, 611–29 (1992) (discussing the development of new canons in the Rehnquist Court); Nina A. 
Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon 
Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. at *36 (forthcoming 2018) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 149, 149 (2001) (stating that “the Court has changed its practice, and sometimes the formally 
stated rules, with remarkable frequency”). 
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Supreme Court but soldiering on in the lower courts.91 
In addition, it also turns out that certain canons have a natural 
lifecycle. That is, canons become prominent at different levels of the 
judicial system at different times. Think of a snake that swallows a 
mouse. One can see the bulge start at the snake’s head and move slowly 
tailward as the mouse is digested. One might observe something similar 
when the Supreme Court creates a new interpretive canon. The canon 
is first prominent in the Supreme Court itself. The Court’s use of the 
canon then declines as the activity slides to the courts of appeals and 
district courts, which digest the new development by working out its 
details and applying it to various cases. Eventually, the canon ends up, 
now fully absorbed into the system, in the lower courts’ routine 
unpublished decisions.92 
For the sake of clarity, the changes in the interpretive regime 
under discussion here should be distinguished from the phenomenon 
of individual statutes having their own interpretive lifecycles. A new 
statute initially presents numerous questions of first impression. 
Gradually, as the important questions are answered, precedent 
becomes the dominant interpretive tool and many disputes merely 
require application of settled law to particular facts.93 These statute-
level changes ordinarily would not cause regime-level shifts, though 
such an effect is possible if, for instance, Congress stops passing a type 
of legislation associated with a subject-specific substantive canon.94 
C. Summary of Predictions and Key Questions 
The foregoing pages discussed several potential drivers of 
interpretive divergence. Admittedly, it is not always clear how a 
particular feature of the lower courts should cash out in terms of 
interpretive methodology. But we do know enough to form some 
tentative predictions about what statutory interpretation in lower 
 
 91. Bruhl, supra note 1, at 521 (discussing canons involving civil rights, jurisdiction, and 
Indian law). 
 92. See infra Part II.F (describing such a pattern in connection with federalism canons). 
 93. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? 
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 224–
26 (2006) (presenting evidence of a link between statutory age and declining use of legislative 
history for several statutes governing the workplace); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus 
Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 
1722–25 (2010) (showing that the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history generally declined 
with statutory age, though usage increased again once a statute became very old). 
 94. See Bruhl, supra note 1 at 524–26 (tentatively proposing that the decline of the civil-rights 
canon is partly explained by the aging of the leading civil-rights statutes). 
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courts should look like and to identify key questions to investigate. 
One overarching expectation is that hierarchical divergence must 
stay within certain bounds. All federal courts are part of the same 
appellate system. Whether or not the Supreme Court’s methodology is 
binding as a formal matter, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements and 
patterns of conduct are highly salient and likely to be practically 
influential.95 Professional norms of craft and the natural desire to 
advance one’s reputation mean that lower-court judges want to do (and 
be seen as doing) good work.96 The Supreme Court’s style provides the 
natural benchmark for such evaluation.97 So too, if the Supreme Court 
or particularly vocal members of it announce that the interpretive 
ground rules have changed and that textualism is the new philosophy, 
then the lower courts can be expected to take notice and adjust their 
own practices. 
A key question, though, is how closely and quickly the lower 
courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead. The analysis below will 
provide several opportunities to test how much slack exists in the 
system. Most notably, it will examine, in a study that spans several 
decades and all three tiers of the federal judiciary, whether the 
textualist renaissance of the 1980s and 1990s manifested itself in all 
courts or only in the Supreme Court.98 And, zooming in on one specific 
topic, it studies the spread of the Rehnquist Court’s “new federalism” 
canons.99 
One strong prediction—which is derived from the overlapping 
influence of caseload pressures, lower average difficulty of cases, lower 
average quality of briefing, and other factors—is that the lower courts’ 
interpretive practices should be simpler than the Supreme Court’s 
practices. The district courts’ practices should be least complex of all. 
Simplicity, in this context, is operating as a term of art that means a 
couple of specific things. First, it means that fewer interpretive tools will 
be used in a decision. More specifically, all tools for resolving cases of 
first impression—such as textual analysis, legislative history, and 
substantive canons—should be less prevalent as one moves down the 
judicial hierarchy. Correspondingly, precedent should loom larger, the 
 
 95. See supra Part I.A. 
 96. See BAUM, supra note 28, at 53–54, 97–104 (noting judges’ concern about their standing 
among legal audiences). 
 97. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 98. Infra Part II.E. 
 99. Infra Part II.F. 
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lower the court. When precedent resolves a case, other sources need 
not be discussed as a doctrinal matter, and unnecessary discussion of 
them is a luxury that a busy court can little afford. Second, the lower 
courts’ use of tools other than precedent should be skewed toward 
simpler tools and away from more complicated tools. Tools are more 
complex, for these purposes, to the extent that they require 
consideration of more numerous, more voluminous, and more 
ambiguous materials. People could reasonably debate whether a 
certain tool is simple or complicated, but most would agree that whole-
act interpretations—and even more so, whole-code strategies—are 
more complicated than narrower word- or clause-bound strategies such 
as those relying on dictionaries and syntax. It is unclear where 
legislative history falls on the simplicity scale, but what is clear is that 
within the category of legislative history there are variations in 
complexity. Committee reports are generally more accessible and 
understandable than floor debates that might be scattered throughout 
hundreds of pages of the Congressional Record. 
In addition to the general prediction of simplicity, one can expect 
some substantive canons to be concentrated at either the top or the 
bottom of the judiciary. For example, we should expect the lower 
courts, especially the district courts, to deal more often with canons 
regarding jurisdiction and procedure due to docket composition and 
limited opportunity to appeal such issues. 
For some interpretive tools, different factors push in different 
directions, rendering the total predicted effect on prevalence 
indeterminate. Such is the case, notably, with deference doctrines like 
Chevron. On the one hand, the district courts could be eager to defer 
to agencies because of their caseload-driven demand for decision-
making shortcuts and the general lack of political salience in their 
cases. On the other hand, opportunities to use some deference regimes 
are limited in the lower courts: many suits challenging agency action 
skip over the district courts altogether, and government amicus briefs 
offering new authoritative interpretations are rare outside of the 
Supreme Court.100 In any event, it is valuable to investigate differences 
in the use of important interpretive tools like these even without clear 
hypotheses in mind. 
Another prediction is that the differences between Supreme Court 
opinions and lower-court opinions should be starkest in the lower 
 
 100. Supra text accompanying notes 50 and 82. 
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courts’ unpublished opinions. In the courts of appeals, only about 15 
percent of opinions are designated for publication. Judges designate 
opinions as unpublished when they believe that they break no new 
ground and would not usefully contribute to the body of precedent.101 
Published and unpublished opinions look very different. Unpublished 
decisions mostly apply settled precedent, often in a cursory way. They 
tend not to include much original interpretative work at all. Often, the 
two kinds of opinions are generated through different decisional 
pathways. Unpublished opinions usually result from cases that did not 
get oral argument, and they are sometimes drafted by central staff 
attorneys.102 Unless the courts’ publication standards are meaningless 
or routinely ignored, one should expect systematic divergences 
between the interpretation-related features of published and 
unpublished decisions. In particular, it is reasonable to expect that all 
interpretive tools, apart from precedent, are particularly sparse in 
unpublished decisions. A likely exception to this generalization is the 
rule of lenity, which applies to the construction of criminal statutes. 
There are many very weak appeals by criminal defendants, including 
appeals in which the defendant acknowledges that the arguments are 
foreclosed by precedent.103 Given the abundance of hopeless criminal 
appeals, it would not be surprising to see lenity appear often in 
unpublished appellate decisions, if only to reject the defendants’ lenity-
based pleas. 
In the district courts, too, most opinions are not published in 
West’s official reporters.104 Those few district-court opinions that are 
published are selected because, in the estimation of the judge or West’s 
attorneys, the decision is important or novel enough to be of general 
interest to the profession.105 So here too there should be systematic 
 
 101. See, e.g., In re Viola, 583 F. App’x 669, 669 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1. 
Publication rates are available in the Administrative Office’s annual Judicial Business reports at 
tables B-12 or S-3, depending on the year. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 42. The publication 
rates vary over time, but 15 percent is a rough average for the last decade. Reports going back 
two decades are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-
business-united-states-courts [http://perma.cc/X6P9-AE7W]. The traditional label of “published” 
is a bit misleading today, as even unpublished decisions are widely available. The real difference 
is that only published appellate opinions are binding precedent. E.g., 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(b); see 
GARNER ET AL., supra note 41, at 142. 
 102. See supra note 42. 
 103. E.g., United States v. Presas, 45 F. App’x 321, 321 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 104. See infra note 166 (describing the publication process in district courts). 
 105. See Ellen Platt, Unpublished vs. Unreported: What’s the Difference?, 5 PERSPECTIVES: 
TEACHING LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 26, 27 (1996); Submission Guidelines for Court 
Opinions, THOMSON REUTERS, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/practice/
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variations, with the rather rare published opinions being more likely to 
feature extensive statutory-interpretive analysis than the more 
numerous and routine unpublished ones. 
II.  RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS 
With some key questions and predictions now in hand, this Part of 
the Article examines the interpretive practices of lower courts, 
especially the federal district courts, and compares them to the 
practices of the Supreme Court. There is no established protocol or 
single right approach to studying interpretive methodology. The best 
way to derive robust conclusions is to use multiple methods, search 
strategies, and comparisons. If different approaches yield similar 
results, that corroboration justifies greater confidence in the findings. 
It is also important to be transparent about one’s methods and, where 
possible, to externally validate one’s measures. 
In an effort to achieve the desired robustness, this Article uses 
several distinct methods. One method studies a period of 40 years to 
track the changing use of several interpretive tools that figure 
prominently in the battle between textualism and opposing 
philosophies: legislative history, linguistic canons, dictionaries, and 
holistic-textual canons. Another portion of the analysis considers more 
than 20 canons over the period of a decade and identifies the 
interpretive tools that are most overrepresented and underrepresented 
in the lower courts as compared to the Supreme Court. Another 
approach is the matched-corpus method, in which the same cases are 
examined at all three levels of the federal judicial system. This method 
shows whether interpretive differences persist once one controls for 
the biasing effect of the Supreme Court’s case-selection process. That 
is, the matched-corpus method reveals whether the lower courts and 
the Supreme Court are doing the same things differently as well as doing 
different things. Finally, there is a case study showing how one of the 
Rehnquist Court’s state-sovereignty canons moved through different 
levels of the judicial system and different kinds of opinions. 
To preview briefly, the findings from the different methods are 
consistent where they overlap and mostly support the hypotheses 
developed in Part I. The lower courts use fewer interpretive tools 
overall, and they especially avoid the most complex tools. This is true 
even in cases that eventually reach the Supreme Court. In addition, the 
 
government/custom-publish-guidelines [https://perma.cc/VR2X-NLUB]. 
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lower courts’ interpretive practices tend to reflect, though in a rather 
loose way, the shifting trends in the Supreme Court’s methods. In 
particular, the lower courts engaged in a textualist shift similar to the 
Supreme Court’s, but it was lesser in magnitude. 
Before presenting the different analyses and results, it is 
appropriate to provide some details regarding this study’s 
methodology. Readers who are eager to see the results are welcome to 
skip ahead to Part II.C. 
A. Ways in Which Interpretation Can Differ Across Courts 
There are several ways that interpretive methods could vary across 
different courts. These include differences in doctrinal formulations of 
the governing rules and differences in case outcomes. Most of the 
analyses in this Article focus instead on variations in the frequency with 
which various canons and tools are used in different courts. It is 
therefore important to briefly describe the ways that interpretive 
methods could vary across courts and to explain why measuring canon 
frequency, rather than other forms of interpretive divergence, is an 
especially attractive strategy for studying cross-court differences. 
One kind of cross-court divergence in interpretive approaches is 
doctrinal divergence. For example, courts might disagree over whether 
legislative history is ever a permissible input or over whether a statute 
is governed by a substantive canon. When the Supreme Court has been 
clear and consistent, such disputes should be rare even in a world of 
only semiprecedential methodology. The rarity of sharp doctrinal 
conflicts limits their usefulness as a tool for studying cross-court 
differences. A more mundane form of doctrinal divergence is 
disagreement over how exactly to formulate an acknowledged 
interpretive canon or how much force to give it—for example, whether 
to describe a rule disfavoring extraterritorial application of U.S. law as 
a mere presumption or as a clear-statement rule.106 The difficulty in 
studying these sorts of divergences is that courts may not always be 
fully aware of such nuances and therefore might slip back and forth 
between different formulations. 
A second way to understand interpretive divergence across the 
hierarchy of courts is to measure whether different courts tend to reach 
different interpretive outcomes. That is, if one court regularly 
 
 106. Cf. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 263 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for changing a mere presumption against extraterritorial application into 
a clear-statement rule). 
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interprets criminal statutes to reach more conduct than another court, 
other explanations having been ruled out, then that court shows less 
“lenity in fact,” even if both courts say the same thing, or nothing at all, 
about the rule of lenity. Similarly, one could study whether different 
courts are more or less likely to defer to agency interpretations.107 A 
difficulty in studying statutory interpretation through case outcomes 
lies in controlling for other variables that influence outcomes at the 
case level or court level. Docket composition and ideological factors 
would need to be considered, for example. Likewise relevant, but much 
harder to measure and quantify, are many other outcome-relevant 
features of a given case. 
Interpretive tools are especially difficult targets for outcome-
oriented study. For one thing, the invocation of a particular tool may 
appear to cause a particular outcome, but the causal relationship might 
actually run in the opposite direction. That is, it could be that judges 
are choosing outcomes and then selecting (or instructing the clerks to 
select) the tools that explain or justify them. Even setting that risk 
aside, the nature of the canons is that they merely contribute to the 
determination of legal meaning. They are not rigid, case-determinative 
rules. As Judge Easterbrook put it, writing in a particularly canon-
skeptical tone, “every canon implicitly begins or ends with the 
statement ‘unless the context indicates otherwise,’ which potentially 
leaves so much room for maneuver that the canon isn’t doing much 
work.”108 As even the canons’ staunchest advocates concede, different 
canons need to be synthesized and reconciled through the use of sound 
professional judgment.109 Further, the triggering conditions for many 
canons and tools are vague, such as a requirement that the text be 
“ambiguous.”110 Ambiguity is a troublesome trigger because there is no 
agreement on how clear a text must be in order to count as 
unambiguous. And even if different judges agreed that the threshold 
clarity should be, say, 65 percent clear, they might still disagree over 
 
 107. E.g., Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 28–32, 43 (2017); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1238, 1271, 1280 (2007); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & 
Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 519 (2011).  
 108. Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 83.  
 109. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 51, 59–62 (2012). 
 110. See Kavanaugh, supra note 31, at 2135–36 (listing legislative history, the avoidance 
canon, and Chevron as examples of tools only triggered by a finding of ambiguity). 
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whether a particular text reaches that mark.111 Even in the formalist’s 
heaven, then, there would be only slight associations between the use 
of a particular interpretive tool and case outcomes. 
Rather than studying interpretive divergence through doctrinal 
differences or case outcomes, this Article largely focuses on a third way 
that courts might diverge, one that considers doctrine but studies it in 
a quantitative way. In particular, this Article focuses on the frequency 
with which different courts use various interpretive canons and 
sources.112 This measure is important and tractable. To a significant 
degree, the observable difference between competing interpretive 
approaches lies in which tools they prioritize and emphasize.113 A judge 
that uses linguistic canons and dictionaries extensively but uses 
legislative history sparingly is more textualist than a judge who displays 
the opposite tendencies. The choice of tools gives concrete expression 
to differences in interpretive philosophy. Happily, the invocation of 
interpretive tools in an opinion is easier to measure than the underlying 
philosophies in the abstract. 
Further, although one cannot draw a straight line from particular 
canons to case outcomes, that does not mean that canons have no effect 
on outcomes. They narrow the possibilities. They make certain 
decisional pathways easier to follow and explain.114 Especially in the 
lower courts—and in the district courts most of all—where caseloads 
are high and ideological stakes are usually low, canons and other 
legalistic tools probably exert significant influence on decisions.115 
Finally, even if canons have nothing to do with generating 
outcomes, the invocation of certain canons over others is still 
 
 111. Id. at 2135–38. 
 112. Cf. Anita S. Krishnakumar & Victoria F. Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 19) (citing frequency of use as one factor that determines 
whether an interpretive practice is a valid canon of interpretation), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3141356 [https://perma.cc/U4AU-XXVF]. 
 113. See Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 34, at 860–61 (identifying interpretive philosophies 
based on which tools a judge uses). 
 114. Cf. Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 305–06, 308–10 (2002) (describing “jurisprudential 
regimes”—the frameworks that structure and influence judicial decision-making by mediating 
between case facts and outcomes). 
 115. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 9–11 (explaining that ideology matters more and 
legal considerations matter less as one moves up the judiciary); see also Brian Sheppard, Judging 
Under Pressure: A Behavioral Examination of the Relationship Between Legal Decisionmaking 
and Time, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 931, 980 (2012) (providing experimental evidence that reducing 
the time available for decision-making increases the likelihood that decisionmakers will obey 
legal constraints). 
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meaningful because it reveals the court’s interpretive language—the 
way the court explains its decisions and seeks to persuade judges and 
attorneys of their correctness.116 If courts speak different languages, 
then the attorneys arguing before them need to speak the right 
language to the right court. 
B. Overview of Research Methods 
Several methodological matters about how to study canon 
frequency require brief comment. 
1. Identifying Cases that Use Canons.  As explained above, this 
Article studies interpretive approaches by examining how often courts 
use canons. This is done differently in different parts of the Article, 
depending on the goal at issue and the number of cases involved. For 
the matched-corpus analysis in Section II.D, which involves only a 
couple of hundred cases at each level of the judiciary, I used 
intentionally overinclusive search terms to identify potential hits and 
then read the material around the terms to decide whether a particular 
canon or source was being used to interpret a statute. For example, a 
search might use the word “hearing,” and then the search results would 
be reviewed to identify the cases that actually involve the use of a 
legislative hearing in connection with statutory interpretation. 
The analysis in other parts of this Article covers one or more 
decades and many thousands of cases, making human reading 
impractical. To get a sense of scale, consider that the search strategy 
described in the next section identified over 100,000 unpublished 
district-court decisions over the last decade that involved statutory 
interpretation. Reading even a meaningful sample of those decisions 
would be impractical. Therefore, apart from the manageably sized 
matched-corpus study in Section II.D, the analyses in this Article rely 
on electronic searches, primarily in Westlaw, to identify and count 
cases. This means that search terms had to be carefully selected to 
reduce the incidence of false positives and false negatives. Here are two 
examples of search strings used in this study: 
 
For linguistic canons: 
adv: OP(((expressio or expresio or inclusio or “last antecedent” or 
 
 116. See Bruhl, supra note 1, at 505; Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law 
Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative 
History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998). 
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“noscitur a sociis” or “ejusdem generis”) /50 (statut! or act or legislat! 
or congress! or U.S.C.)) or ((expressio or expresio or inclusio or “last 
antecedent” or “noscitur a sociis” or “ejusdem generis”) /p (statut! or 
act or legislat! or congress! or U.S.C.))) and DA([year]) 
For Congressional Record:  
adv: OP(“Cong.Rec.” or “Cong. Rec.” or “Congressional Record”) 
and OP((statut! or legislat! or congress! or U.S.C.) /s (interpret! or 
constru! or meaning or reading)) and DA([year])117 
Each of these search strings begins with the tool or tools at issue, 
including variant spellings and citation forms. The search string then 
adds a qualification meant to restrict the results to cases involving the 
interpretation of statutes rather than other texts, though admittedly 
with the result of excluding some statutory cases too. This restriction 
was important because linguistic canons and some other tools are used 
in contracts and insurance cases to interpret nonstatutory texts, and 
these cases arise frequently in the lower courts due to diversity 
jurisdiction. Some trial-and-error pilot testing helped to identify good 
search strings, that is, those that neither err too far toward false 
positives nor toward false negatives.118 Other search strings would 
generate somewhat different results, but that is acceptable for at least 
two reasons. First, the goal is to make cross-court comparisons in the 
use of canons, not to determine the precise levels of canon use in an 
absolute sense. Second, using different strategies in combination—
such as these large-n electronic searches plus the individualized manual 
scrutiny applied in the matched-corpus analysis—justifies confidence 
in the robustness of repeated similar results. 
Using electronic search strings in a large-n study restricts the range 
of interpretive tools that can be reliably studied. Fortunately, many 
interpretive tools are closely associated with particular names, phrases, 
or standard citation forms that make them easy to identify (for 
example, ejusdem generis and S. Rep./S. Rpt. or the words “Senate,” 
“committee,” and “report” in close proximity). Other tools cannot be 
identified so reliably and thus require human intervention. The use of 
the common law as an interpretive tool is an example of the latter, 
 
 117. The “adv” prefix instructs Westlaw to conduct a “terms and connectors” search rather 
than use the fuzzier search algorithms employed by default in the new WestlawNext system. The 
“OP” field limits the search to the opinions, excluding the West-created material in synopses, Key 
Numbers, and headnotes, all of which could introduce artificial cross-court and cross-period 
variation. 
 118. The search terms used for each tool are on file with the Duke Law Journal. 
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because there are many other reasons for “common law” to appear 
near references to statutes. As a result, some tools are included in the 
matched-corpus analysis but not elsewhere. 
The methodology used in this Article does not involve any 
judgment about whether a canon was the primary determinant of the 
court’s decision or how much reliance the court placed on the source. 
Such judgments produce useful information, but they also introduce 
more subjectivity and make it difficult to analyze large numbers of 
cases. Further, “negative” uses of a canon—such as statements that a 
particular canon is unpersuasive or inapplicable to a case—are 
included in the results. That choice is sensible as a matter of 
interpretive theory because even those kinds of uses of a canon or 
source show that the tool is a recognized part of the court’s interpretive 
vocabulary. If a particular canon were not cited by attorneys and at 
least conceivably usable as judicial authority, there would be no need 
for the court to justify not applying it in a given case.119 Including 
negative citations is also a practical necessity for the large-n portions 
of the analysis. Finally, for purposes of this study, canons count if they 
appear in any opinion in a case, not just majority opinions. 
2. Selecting a Denominator.  Some parts of this analysis calculate 
citation rates and compare them across courts. Calculating a rate 
requires a denominator by which to divide the raw numbers of 
citations. Deriving an appropriate denominator takes some thought. 
Using the number of cases filed each year is too crude, as many district-
court cases are resolved through early settlements or guilty pleas 
without any judicial opinions. At the other extreme, a few district-court 
cases generate multiple published opinions at various stages of the 
litigation. The number of written decisions would therefore be a better 
denominator, but that denominator would also be inadequate because 
many written decisions in the lower courts do not address statutory 
interpretation but instead concern factual issues, discretionary case-
management matters, state common law, and so on. 
I used a denominator that is meant to capture cases that 
meaningfully engage with statutory interpretation, as determinable 
through a Westlaw search string.120 Different search terms would 
 
 119. See Mendelson, supra note 90, at *24–25 (arguing that “questions of a canon’s 
applicability are often difficult ones,” so when a court discusses but does not apply a canon, that 
discussion still clarifies the function of the canon in general). 
 120. The Westlaw search string I used to generate the denominator is adv: OP((statut! or 
legislat! or congress! or U.S.C.) /s (interpret! or constru! or meaning or reading)) and DA([year]). 
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generate different denominators and thus different rates, of course, so 
it would be a mistake to make precise claims about what percentage of 
cases use various tools. The aim is instead to provide a measure that 
facilitates comparisons across the judicial hierarchy by roughly 
adjusting for varying caseloads across courts and over time. The 
denominator used in this study meets those aims. 
To provide an external check on the validity of this denominator, 
I compared my denominator to the number of cases in the Spaeth 
Supreme Court Database in which the primary or secondary legal 
authorities were coded as statutory.121 The two figures are not 
measuring exactly the same concept, but the two data series showed 
the same rising, falling, and leveling-off patterns over the period from 
1975 to 2014, and they yielded a reassuringly high correlation 
coefficient of 0.86 (p < 0.001). That provides confidence that the 
denominator used here is a good measure for the Supreme Court and, 
by extension, for other courts as well.122 
I should note that some parts of this analysis do not rely on citation 
rates and therefore do not require a denominator. Again, the goal is to 
use multiple methods and to repose the most confidence in mutually 
reinforcing results. 
3. Sources and Databases.  Different data sources were used to 
collect cases for different parts of this Article. For the matched-corpus 
study in Section II.D, it was important to attempt to locate a district-
court opinion for every Supreme Court case in the corpus. To secure 
these opinions, it was necessary to search Westlaw, Lexis, docket 
 
 121. To be precise, these are the Spaeth Supreme Court Database cases in which the variables 
authorityDecision1 or authorityDecision2 were coded as 4. For another source that uses the 
Database to calculate a denominator in this way, see Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and 
Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 
1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 366 n.346 (2013). The figure derived from the Database is not 
measuring exactly the same thing as my denominator, because the former includes cases 
interpreting federal treaties and court rules, and because it is oriented toward the nature of the 
source at issue rather than the activity undertaken. See HAROLD SPAETH, LEE EPSTEIN, TED 
RUGER, SARAH C. BENESH, JEFFREY SEGAL & ANDREW D. MARTIN, SUPREME COURT 
DATABASE CODE BOOK 55 (2017), http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?s=2 
[https://perma.cc/N3MC-XJZG]. 
 122. If there were a generally accepted measure for how many lower-court cases engage in 
statutory interpretation, I would use that, but no such measure has been widely agreed upon. 
There are government statistics that track filings and appeals by subject—for example, diversity 
cases, employment discrimination, and criminal sentencing—but the fact that a case is based on a 
statutory claim does not mean that the case involves the work of statutory interpretation. The 
resolution of a statutory claim could, for example, instead involve the assessment of the 
sufficiency of the evidence or the exercise of sentencing discretion. 
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sheets, and other sources.123 For the time trends and other portions of 
the analysis, which involved searches over one or more decades and 
tens of thousands of cases, Westlaw was the main source. For purposes 
of this research, Westlaw appears to be more accurate than its 
competitor Lexis.124 
4. Published vs. Unpublished Opinions.  As noted above, the large 
majority of decisions of the courts of appeals and district courts are not 
formally published.125 The opinions that are published are not remotely 
a random sample of all opinions.126 On the contrary, they are 
specifically selected for publication because they are significant. 
Therefore, to achieve an understanding of how the judicial system 
actually works, and how judges actually engage in statutory 
interpretation, one needs to consider the large body of unpublished 
opinions as well as the smaller group of published opinions. 
Fortunately, even many unpublished decisions are now accessible 
through one source or another. Although some unpublished district-
court opinions still linger in relative obscurity on docket sheets,127 the 
 
 123. See infra text accompanying notes 159–63 (describing the sources employed in the 
matched-corpus study). 
 124. The two services’ databases are not coextensive, and their search algorithms operate a 
bit differently, so using Lexis would yield very similar but not identical results. One reason that 
Westlaw is better for this study is that searching the “opinion” segment in Lexis excludes the 
opinion’s footnotes, so the Lexis searches fail to find cases in which the search terms occur only 
in the footnotes. For other studies of district courts that have favored Westlaw, see Elizabeth Y. 
McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 
NEB. L. REV. 387, 424 (2012); and David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, 
Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 710 & n.138 (2007). One 
quirk of Westlaw’s district-court database is that it includes decisions from the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation and from the Customs Court. Those decisions were removed from the 
results. 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 101–05. 
 126. See Pauline T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd & Andrew D. Martin, How 
Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 96–98 (2009) 
(“[A]uthoring judges decide whether to designate a particular opinion for publication, and their 
decision to do so may depend upon formal rules, court culture, personal predilections, or strategic 
considerations.”); Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. 
L. REV. 973, 988–89 (2008) (“[T]he published opinions are considered to be the ‘interesting’ and 
‘important’ opinions, in the words of West’s publication guide . . . .”). It is also true that written 
opinions, whether published or unpublished, do not represent all district-court action, much of 
which happens in oral rulings or one-line orders. See Kim et al., supra, at 98–101. However, in 
order to study judicial methods of statutory interpretation, one needs reasoned opinions of some 
sort, whether published, unpublished, or in the form of a reasoned ruling from the bench. 
 127. See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEVADA L.J. 515, 517 (2016) 
(identifying a set of precedent even more submerged than unpublished decisions: the “mass of 
reasoned opinions—putative precedent and not mere evidence of decision-making—that exist 
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Westlaw and Lexis databases are dramatically more comprehensive 
today than they used to be. For example, the number of unpublished 
district-court opinions on Westlaw that meet my denominator filter has 
increased more than tenfold from 1990 to the present, growing from 
about 1100 per year to about 12,000. For a point of comparison, the 
denominator for published district-court opinions has remained 
relatively stable at 1800 to 2400 per year. Most of this jump in 
unpublished opinions is attributable to broader availability on Westlaw 
and Lexis, not to busier courts.128 
Most of the analyses in this Article considered all published 
opinions as well as those unpublished opinions that are available 
through Westlaw. The matched-corpus analysis goes further; in an 
effort to gather lower-court opinions that correspond to every included 
Supreme Court case, it was sometimes necessary to search docket 
sheets and other sources. Nevertheless, the results reported here do not 
always display all categories of opinions. The unpublished opinions of 
the courts of appeals almost never include significant interpretive 
content.129 That fact is important in its own right, but most of the 
analysis below omits detailed reporting of unpublished appellate 
opinions because there is little to report. 
C. Top-Heavy and Bottom-Heavy Canons 
A good place to begin the comparison of interpretive methods is 
to examine whether different courts tend to use different interpretive 
tools. This first inquiry is important because it may reveal that the 
Supreme Court’s interpretive practices are quite different from those 
of the lower courts, which decide most of the cases and in which most 
litigators practice. Recall that two of the hypotheses developed above 
were that lower courts would both use fewer tools and emphasize less 
complicated tools. Are those suppositions correct? 
 
 
only on dockets.”); Peter W. Martin, District Court Opinions that Remain Hidden Despite a 
Longstanding Congressional Mandate of Transparency—The Result of Judicial Autonomy and 
Systemic Indifference, at *3 (Jan. 12, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3034399 
[https://perma.cc/N2WM-W6F8] (“Large numbers [of district-court decisions] remain hidden 
from lawyers, academics, and the general public.”).  
 128. The number of unpublished district-court cases in the denominator exploded around 
2005, which likely reflects either a change in the companies’ collection processes or the impact of 
the E-Government Act of 2002, which mandates that courts make more decisions publicly 
available. Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002). 
 129. See infra Part II.D. 
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This Section approaches those hypotheses by providing data on 
cross-tier differences in the use of around 20 tools of interpretation. 
This analysis uses both citation rates and ratios. Citation rates reflect 
the number of times a tool is cited, divided by the denominator of cases 
that meaningfully engage with statutory interpretation.130 Citation 
ratios require a bit more explanation. If a canon appeared in 5000 
district-court decisions and 50 Supreme Court decisions, the canon 
would have a 100:1 ratio. Suppose a different canon had a 10:1 ratio; 
that is, it appeared only 10 times in the district courts for every 1 
appearance in the Supreme Court. The canon with the 10:1 ratio would 
be top-heavy in the sense that its use is skewed toward the Supreme 
Court relative to the 100:1 canon, which, in turn, is bottom-heavy. 
Notably, conclusions about relative top- and bottom-heaviness do not 
require an agreed-upon denominator; nor do these conclusions require 
the calculation of a neutral ratio that would reflect that all courts had 
acted the same. 
The analysis in this section covers the decade spanning from 2005 
to 2014, which roughly corresponds to the first decade of the Roberts 
Court.131 The analysis relies on Westlaw searches to identify cases from 
each of the three levels of the federal judiciary that used various 
interpretive canons or sources.132 Most of the tools in the figures below 
should be familiar,133 but a few notes are in order: The entry for “whole 
act” encompasses searches for the presumption of consistent usage, the 
presumption of meaningful variation, and the in pari materia canon. 
For legislative history, the searches covered three important sources—
committee reports (including conference committee reports), material 
from the Congressional Record, and committee hearings—along with 
a combined category for all three. “Defer to brief” refers to cases in 
which the court defers to an agency interpretation provided in the 
government’s brief.134 In addition, and as explained in greater detail 
below, the searches included multiple formulations of the rule of 
 
 130. See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (describing how these measures are derived). 
 131. Chief Justice Roberts began his service on the Supreme Court in September 2005. 
 132. These Westlaw search strings are on file with the author and are available upon request. 
 133. For the benefit of readers who may not recognize some of the canons or sources listed in 
the figures, good reference works providing definitions and examples are WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY app. B 
(5th ed. 2014); and WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
(2007). 
 134. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
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lenity.135 
Figure 1 presents the citation rates. The interpretive tools are 
arranged left to right from lowest to highest citation rate in 
unpublished district-court opinions. The results in Figure 1 should not 
be used to draw precise conclusions about the prevalence of various 
canons, as the reported citation rates are sensitive to the phrasing of 
the search terms and how one chooses to group canons together.136 
Rather, the point is to make cross-court comparisons within each 
canon. In that regard, one immediately sees that almost all the tools 
appear most often in Supreme Court opinions. Indeed, most tools 
display a stair-step pattern with usage rates lowest in unpublished 
district-court opinions and then increasing from there. That pattern is 
consistent with the hypothesis of hierarchically increasing interpretive 
complexity. 
There are some interesting exceptions to the pattern of stair-step 
increases in citation rates within each source. One notable exception is 
Chevron, for which the courts of appeals, rather than the Supreme 
Court, are the leading users. Another is the canon of narrowly 
construing statutes conferring federal jurisdiction,137 at the far right of 
the figure, which displays an inverted pattern in which it appears most 
often in unpublished district-court decisions and least often in 
appellate courts. 
 
 135. Infra Part II.C.1. 
 136. Mendelson’s study of the Roberts-era Supreme Court uses roughly similar methods over 
a similar time period but covers different canons and defines and groups the canons differently. 
As a result, our citation rates for the Supreme Court are not directly comparable. Nonetheless, 
for most of the canons that are covered in both studies and defined similarly, the results are 
similar. See Mendelson, supra note 90, at *63 app. The biggest difference concerns expressio unius, 
which Mendelson finds at a high rate of about 18 percent. Id. In my study, it appears in only a few 
percent of the cases, and it is grouped with several other linguistic canons. The explanation is that 
my search for this canon includes only the named canon itself, which is typically used in 
conjunction with the core, list-focused form of the canon. Mendelson’s expressio unius canon 
includes broader uses of the same idea, such as those involving contrasts between different 
sections of a law or between different laws. Id. at *42. As the purpose of my study is to make 
reliable cross-court comparisons, the precise percentage differences between canons are of 
secondary importance. 
 137. E.g., Surface Am., Inc. v. United Sur. & Indem. Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286 (D.P.R. 
2012) (“As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts are bound to construe jurisdictional grants 
narrowly.”). This canon is also described as a presumption against jurisdiction, especially removal 
jurisdiction. See generally Bruhl, supra note 1, at 506–49 (describing this canon’s meaning, origins, 
and justifications). 
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Figure 1: Citation Rates for Selected Interpretive Tools, 2005–2014 
Because the tools depicted above vary substantially in prevalence, 
and because cross-canon differences are sensitive to differences in 
search strategies, the ratio method is particularly well suited for our 
task of studying cross-court differences in the relative importance of 
different tools. Figure 2 below shows the citation ratios for various 
canons in published opinions of the lower courts compared to the 
Supreme Court. The canons are arranged according to the district 
court–to–Supreme Court ratio, with relatively top-heavy, Supreme 
Court–focused canons at the top of the chart and bottom-heavy canons 
at the bottom. The presumption against preemption, which falls in the 
middle of the pack, can be used to explain how to read the figure. For 
every 1 Supreme Court case citing the presumption against 
preemption, there are about 15 published district-court opinions citing 
it and about 10 published court of appeals opinions citing it. For the 
most part, the citation ratio for each canon is similar for the district 
courts and courts of appeals, though several canons are significantly 
more prominent at one level than the other. Chevron, for example, is 
skewed toward the courts of appeals, and the jurisdiction canon is 
heavily skewed toward the district courts. 
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Figure 2: Citation Ratios for Selected Interpretive Tools, 2005–2014     
(published opinions) 
 
As noted, one can appreciate the relative top- and bottom-
heaviness of the listed canons without knowing the baseline neutral 
ratio—that is, the ratio that would result if courts at each level had the 
same propensities in their statutory-interpretation cases. To provide 
some context, however, it might be useful to know that a rough 
estimate of the neutral ratio for published opinions of the courts of 
appeals and district courts is in the range of 35:1 or 40:1. That is because 
there are approximately 35 or 40 times more published statutory-
interpretation cases both in the courts of appeals and in the district 
courts over the last decade (about 16,500 cases and 22,000 cases 
respectively) than there have been statutory-interpretation cases in the 
Supreme Court (about 500).138 This ratio is represented by the vertical 
gray bar across the figure. Judged by the neutral ratio, almost all 
canons are overrepresented, on an absolute basis, at the Supreme 
 
 138. These figures represent the results of the denominator searches described in Part II.B.2. 
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Court level. 
The results in Figure 2 would differ somewhat if different search 
strategies were used, so one should not place too much weight on fine 
distinctions in ratios. Instead one should focus on the canons that show 
particularly extreme results, especially where those results align with 
other findings elsewhere in this Article. Easily the most bottom-heavy 
canon in the district courts is the jurisdiction canon, the rule that 
federal jurisdictional statutes are to be narrowly construed. Less 
extreme, but also relatively overrepresented in the lower courts, are 
Chevron, which is especially heavy in the courts of appeals;139 the old-
fashioned formulation of the rule of lenity that calls for “strict 
construction” of penal statutes;140 and a few traditional substantive 
presumptions, particularly the canon disfavoring legislative 
retroactivity. At the other extreme, the most top-heavy canon is the 
“no elephants in mouseholes” rule, followed by deference to 
government amicus briefs, the presumption against implied repeal, 
congressional hearings and debates, constitutional avoidance, and the 
whole-act presumptions. 
The figure above reflects published decisions, but it is also 
worthwhile to consider unpublished district-court decisions. 
(Unpublished decisions from the courts of appeals almost never use 
interpretive tools or canons,141 so they are not shown here.) As Figure 
3 shows, the general patterns of relative top- and bottom-heaviness are 
similar to those on display in the previous figure. For unpublished 
district-court opinions, a reasonable neutral ratio is about 200:1, 
because there are about 200 times more unpublished district-court 
statutory-interpretation decisions from the last decade than there are 
Supreme Court statutory-interpretation decisions. Every canon falls 
short of the neutral ratio except for the jurisdiction canon, which 
appears so often that it was necessary to use a logarithmic scale. The 
relative prominence of the state-sovereignty canon in unpublished 
opinions has an interesting story that is discussed further in Section 
II.F; 25 years ago this canon behaved quite differently. 
 
  
 
 139. I conducted a circuit-by-circuit analysis for Chevron, and it showed, as one would expect, 
that the D.C. Circuit is a particularly heavy user of the doctrine. 
 140. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing different formulations of the rule of lenity). 
 141. See infra Part II.D.  
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Figure 3: Citation Ratios for Selected Interpretive Tools, 2005–2014 
(unpublished district-court opinions) 
 
 
Several of the interpretive tools in Figures 1–3 merit additional 
comment. 
1. Rule of Lenity.  The figures above present three entries for 
different versions of the rule of lenity. For lenity and a few other 
canons, multiple searches were conducted using language aimed at 
capturing alternative formulations of the canon. Often the searches 
included a narrower formulation to minimize false positives and a 
broader formulation to minimize false negatives. For the rule of lenity, 
one search simply looked for the phrase “rule of lenity.” Another 
formulation, which reflects a traditional way of phrasing the canon, 
provides that penal laws are to be strictly, or narrowly, construed.142 
 
 142. E.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (“The rule that penal 
laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself.”); see also 
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The third search, “lenity: all versions,” included both of the previous 
forms. 
The different search terms yielded interestingly different results 
across courts. The traditional strict-construction phrasing suggests a 
fairly robust rule that colors the court’s analysis from the start of every 
case that involves the meaning of a criminal statute. The rule reminds 
the court to be on the lookout for any lack of clarity in the criminal 
prohibition. Some Supreme Court opinions arguably reject that 
traditional strict-construction phrasing in favor of a weaker, last-resort, 
tiebreaking canon.143 Perhaps as a result, the traditional strict-
construction formulation is less common today than other formulations 
of the rule of lenity across all courts. But it is not equally uncommon. 
It has almost disappeared in the Supreme Court, but it is relatively 
more common in the lower courts, especially in the district courts. 
Accordingly, that version of the canon is among the most bottom-
heavy canons, landing near the bottom of Figures 2 and 3.144 
Figure 1 shows that the rule of lenity, in all of its forms, appears at 
roughly the same rates in the published and unpublished decisions of 
the district courts. This is a departure from the usual pattern in which 
canons appear less often in unpublished opinions. Likewise, although 
unpublished opinions from the courts of appeals are not shown in the 
figures above, lenity is the rare canon that appears with any frequency 
in those opinions. This finding aligns with the expectations laid out 
earlier.145 The relatively high representation of the rule of lenity in 
unpublished opinions likely reflects the fact that the calculus for 
criminal defendants, many of whom have free representation, often 
favors pursuing appeals even when the low odds of success would deter 
 
Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959) (referring to “the traditional canon of construction 
which calls for the strict interpretation of criminal statutes”). 
 143. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993) (“The mere possibility of 
articulating a narrower construction . . . does not by itself make the rule of lenity applicable. 
Instead, that venerable rule is reserved for cases where, after seizing every thing from which aid 
can be derived, the Court is left with an ambiguous statute.” (quotation marks, alterations, and 
citations omitted)). Dissents, especially those by Justice Scalia, have more often used the strict-
construction formulation. Compare Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2281 (2014) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (using that formulation), with id. at 2272 n.10 (majority opinion). For a rare 
modern example of the strict-construction formulation in a majority opinion, see United States v. 
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (referring to “the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, 
or rule of lenity”). 
 144. The difference in phrasing does not necessarily indicate a systematic difference in the 
rate at which criminal defendants win. Additional study would be required in order to determine 
whether that is the case. 
 145. See supra text accompanying note 103. 
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a paying litigant. A review of a small sample of these cases confirms 
that the vast majority of the citations of lenity in these cases are 
rejections of defendants’ invocations of the rule. 
2. Varieties of Legislative History.  Given its importance in debates 
over interpretive methodology, legislative history merits separate 
comment. Figure 2 shows that legislative history, as a combined 
category, is neither especially top- nor bottom-heavy. When the 
combined category is disaggregated into its constituent parts, however, 
an interesting pattern emerges. Like the Supreme Court, lower courts 
use committee reports more heavily than the other types of legislative 
history.146 That makes sense given the conventional hierarchy of 
legislative materials, which treats the reports of congressional 
committees (both subject-matter committees and conference 
committees) as the most valuable sources.147 But lower courts use the 
other forms of legislative history under study—legislative hearings and 
floor debate—much less frequently than the Supreme Court. 
Table 1 below illustrates these cross-court disparities. The use of 
congressional hearings declines especially steeply outside of the 
Supreme Court. I suspect that the explanation for this pattern has a few 
parts. First, congressional hearings have traditionally been relatively 
inaccessible in the familiar legal databases.148 Second, attorneys may 
not identify the more obscure pieces of legislative history, and lower-
court judges and their clerks have little time for independent research. 
 
 146. For studies of the Supreme Court showing that it uses committee reports more often than 
the other forms of legislative history, see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 133, at 786; Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and 
Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 237 (2010); Koby, infra note 190, at 387–90. 
 147. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1951) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (“Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is 
inescapably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond Committee reports, which 
presumably are well considered and carefully prepared.”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 239–40 
(2016); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 18–20 (reprt. ed. 2014). A conference 
committee’s explanatory statement is particularly valuable when a bill has changed substantially 
since the committee stage. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: 
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 109–11 (2012). 
 148. Lexis now has an extensive and highly searchable collection in the form of the 
Congressional Hearings Digital Collection, but this development is only about a decade old. See 
Status of Congressional Hearings Digital Collection Content Delivery, LEXISNEXIS, 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/help/CU/new.htm [http://perma.cc/22YD-LNQW]. I suspect many 
judges and attorneys are unfamiliar with the database. Westlaw has less useful coverage. See 
Committee Hearings on Bill, Including Testimony by Witnesses, WESTLAW, 
http://integrationsolutions.westlaw.com/aca/leghist/5.htm [https://perma.cc/RB4W-8ERM]. 
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Third, lower-court judges may not feel competent to piece together bits 
of evidence spread throughout the enactment process in order to 
achieve a complete understanding of the bill’s enactment history. All 
of these factors push the lower courts toward extreme reliance on the 
traditional hierarchy that puts committee reports at the top of the heap. 
 
Table 1: Citation Rates (%) for Different Kinds of Legislative History, 
by Court (2005–2014) 
 SCt CtApp pub DCt pub DCt unpub 
Cmte. reports 34.1 17.0 11.2 2.7 
Cong. Record 14.7 5.9 3.7 0.7 
Cong. hearings 11.4 1.7 1.4 0.2 
3. Constitutional Avoidance.  Another canon that is particularly 
top-heavy is the canon of constitutional avoidance, which also happens 
to be a highly consequential and controversial canon.149 I would not 
have confidently predicted this canon’s top-heaviness, but one can 
plausibly explain it. First, there is relatively little room for 
constitutional doubts in the lower courts. The lower courts have their 
own circuit precedents resolving some constitutional questions, and 
more importantly, the Supreme Court’s decisions bind them 
absolutely, with even the Court’s dicta attaining nearly binding 
status.150 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has the power to 
overrule its precedents or, more commonly, to narrow or reframe 
them.151 Many more constitutional questions are therefore debatable in 
the Supreme Court than in the lower courts. Consequently, there are 
more opportunities for using the canon of constitutional avoidance. 
Second, the Court has more need for avoidance because the 
 
 149. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern 
Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2110–12 (2015); Richard A. Posner, 
Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and In the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 815–16 
(1983). 
 150. See David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court 
Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2042–49 (2013) (observing that today’s lower 
courts only very rarely dismiss the Supreme Court’s statements as dicta). 
 151. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 
1862–63 (2014). 
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significance of a decision striking down or upholding a statute is greater 
in the Supreme Court. As a result, more cases are eligible for and in 
need of the avoidance canon at the Supreme Court level. 
The Bond litigation concerning the constitutionality of the federal 
chemical-weapons statute provides an illustration. The Third Circuit 
concluded that the statute clearly covered Mrs. Bond’s conduct of using 
a dangerous chemical against her apparently adulterous neighbor.152 
Avoidance of the constitutional question—namely, whether the statute 
was valid as an exercise of Congress’s power to implement a treaty—
was therefore not possible. The Third Circuit faced the question and 
upheld the statute on the authority of Missouri v. Holland.153 In 
contrast, the Supreme Court majority in Bond avoided the 
constitutional question by holding that the statute did not apply to 
Bond’s conduct.154 It could be that the Supreme Court and the Third 
Circuit simply disagreed over how clear the statute was. But something 
deeper about the avoidance canon was probably at work as well. A 
Supreme Court opinion either repudiating Holland or reaffirming its 
federalism-threatening implications would have been a very, very big 
deal.155 A court of appeals relying on Holland, on the other hand, is 
exactly what one would expect—a faithful application of Supreme 
Court precedent. 
4. Substantive Presumptions.  Although the avoidance canon is 
top-heavy, several of the policy-based substantive presumptions—
those involving retroactivity, jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, and state 
sovereignty—enjoy relative prominence in the lower courts, including 
in unpublished district-court decisions. Based on my review of many 
cases, it appears that a meaningful proportion of the lower federal 
courts’ uses of the presumption against retroactivity arise in the context 
 
 152. United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 153–55 (3d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
This was the second Third Circuit decision in the case, as the Third Circuit had previously ruled 
that Bond lacked standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality. United States v. Bond, 581 
F.3d 128, 141 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 211 (2011). The Supreme Court reversed on standing, 
necessitating the second Third Circuit ruling. 
 153. Id. at 180; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (stating that “[i]f the treaty 
is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute” that implements it “as a necessary 
and proper means to execute the powers of the Government”). 
 154. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087, 2093–94 (2014). 
 155. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: New Look at Old Precedent, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 2, 2013, 12:04 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/argument-preview-
new-look-at-old-precedent [https://perma.cc/FX3F-AUGH] (“[T]he coming decision in Bond. v. 
United States may wind up with a very prominent place in constitutional history . . . . It is, indeed, 
difficult to imagine how this case can be decided without making history.”). 
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of state legislation and often cite a state-law source for the rule.156 Some 
uses of the extraterritoriality canon likewise involve state law, such as 
the question whether a state statute applies outside the state’s 
borders.157 The lower courts’ need to interpret state law does not, 
however, explain the extreme bottom-heaviness of the canon calling 
for narrow construction of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. That 
canon’s importance in the lower courts instead largely reflects judicial-
structural considerations and perhaps differences in preferences across 
tiers of the judiciary. Hierarchical divergence in the use of substantive 
canons in general, and the jurisdiction canon in particular, warrant 
further consideration once all of this Part’s results are in view.158 
D. The Matched-Corpus Method: Following the Same Cases at All 
Three Levels 
Recall the distinction between doing different things and doing 
things differently. One objection to cross-tier comparisons like those 
presented above is that the bodies of cases encountered at different 
levels of the system are very different. Of course the Supreme Court 
decisions use many more canons and tools, one might say, because its 
docket is composed almost entirely of only the hardest, most debatable 
cases. Most statutory-interpretation decisions in the lower courts are 
easy. Limiting one’s study to published opinions—which the lower 
courts reserve for the small minority of cases that are difficult or 
interesting—partly corrects for differences in case difficulty, but not 
completely. What we really want, the critic would say, is an apples-to-
apples comparison: Do the decisions of the different courts still look so 
different when they are deciding closely comparable cases? 
I think the critic’s demand is misguided to a significant degree. 
Apples-to-apples comparisons are nice, but it is also very much worth 
knowing that apples, which predominate at the Supreme Court, make 
up only a small percentage of the fruit in the lower courts’ basket, with 
the rest being composed of lemons and squishy bananas. The most 
important thing, when it comes to understanding the lower courts, 
might be the realization that there are so few apples to be found! That 
 
 156. E.g., City of Gary v. Shafer, No. 2:07-CV-56-PRC, 2007 WL 2962640, at *4 (N.D. Ind. 
Oct. 4, 2007) (Indiana law). 
 157. E.g., Russo v. APL Marine Servs., Ltd., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2015) 
(California law); Union Underwear Co. v. GI Apparel, Inc., No. CIV. A. 08-00124 (WHW) 2008 
WL 3833475, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2008) (Kentucky law). 
 158. See infra Part II.G. 
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is, while we call all of these things courts, they are different institutions 
with different roles doing rather different things. 
Nonetheless, the critic’s request can be accommodated by using 
what I call the matched-corpus method.159 This method compares the 
Supreme Court’s decisions with the lower courts’ decisions in the very 
same cases. To assemble this matched corpus, I collected all Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting statutes for the years 2011 through 2015 
inclusive, 218 decisions in all.160 I then collected the court of appeals 
opinion under review in each of those Supreme Court cases, along with 
the district-court opinion that led to that court of appeals case. One can 
then observe the same cases—the apples—as they proceed through 
each of the three levels of the judicial system. By looking at the same 
cases at different points in the process, the matched-corpus method 
neutralizes the biasing effect of the Supreme Court’s case-selection 
processes. This method therefore reveals whether different kinds of 
courts do things differently even when they are doing the same things. 
Locating the court of appeals opinions was not particularly 
difficult. A published or unpublished opinion was located for every 
case.161 The district courts did present some complications, but relevant 
opinions were located for the large majority of the cases. The goal was 
to obtain any reasoned written opinions that addressed the statutory-
interpretive question later addressed by the Supreme Court. This 
required searching several sources, including Westlaw, Lexis, 
 
 159. Brudney and Baum use a similar technique to compare the use of dictionaries and 
legislative history in several selected areas of statutory law. See Brudney & Baum, Protean 
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 701–02; James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, 
Dictionaries 2.0: Exploring the Gap Between the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 125 YALE 
L.J. FORUM 104, 104–05 (2015) [hereinafter Brudney & Baum, Dictionaries 2.0]. The study here 
examines more than a dozen interpretive tools and all areas of law, though for a shorter period of 
time. 
 160. I used a lenient standard for identifying the Court’s statutory cases. Cases that, for 
instance, combined both statutory interpretation and constitutional law were included in the data 
set. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106 (2013) (interpreting a statute to assign the 
burden of proof on an issue to the defendant and then holding the statute constitutional as so 
construed). Examples of the kinds of cases that were excluded were constitutional cases; cases 
applying common-law doctrines such as interstate water disputes, preclusion, and abstention; and 
those habeas and qualified-immunity cases (quite a few of which were summary reversals) that 
only concerned whether a certain right was “clearly established” by precedent. I excluded 
opinions on denial of certiorari, as those are not merits decisions. Also excluded were the 
relatively few cases that came from state courts, as this study concerns only comparisons between 
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. 
 161. A small handful of cases involved a direct appeal from a three-judge district court to the 
Supreme Court. In those rare cases, I treated the opinion of the three-judge district court as a 
decision from the court of appeals rather than the district court.  
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Bloomberg Law (which draws material from PACER dockets), and 
petitions for certiorari (the appendices to which include copies of any 
prior opinions in a case). In about 10 percent of the cases, there was no 
district-court decision to look for, as in petitions for review of agency 
action that begin in the courts of appeals. In a few more cases, a district-
court opinion was located but was excluded because it did not or could 
not address the issue the Supreme Court addressed.162 In some cases, 
the district court’s decision on the relevant question took the form of a 
one-line order deciding a motion or an oral ruling delivered during a 
hearing. These were not included in the quantitative analysis. In total, 
a relevant district-court opinion was located for about 80 percent of the 
Supreme Court decisions.163 
As one would expect, the lower-court decisions in the matched 
corpus are not at all typical of the output of the lower courts. Of the 
court of appeals cases in the matched corpus, slightly more than 85 
percent generated published opinions, compared to a publication rate 
of about 15 percent for all decisions in the courts of appeals.164 About 
20 percent of the court of appeals cases in the matched corpus have 
dissents, which again far exceeds the usual dissent rate, which is less 
than 3 percent.165 In the ordinary world, the large majority of cases do 
not yield any district-court opinion available on Lexis or Westlaw.166 
 
 162. E.g., Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 902, 904 (2015) (addressing an issue 
of appellate jurisdiction raised sua sponte by the court of appeals). 
 163. In a few instances, the corpus contains more than one district-court decision from a case, 
such as where the district court addresses the same issue in one opinion and then addresses it 
again after a motion for reconsideration. 
 164. Supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 165. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges  
Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 106 n.9 (2011) 
(reporting a court of appeals dissent rate of 2.6 percent for 1990–2007); see also Harry T. Edwards, 
Collegial Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals at *58 (Nov. 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (estimating a court of appeals dissent rate of 1.3 
percent for 2011–16). Among published decisions, the dissent rate increases, but it remains far 
below the rate of dissents found in the matched-corpus data set. See id. (reporting a 10.6 percent 
dissent rate for published court of appeals decisions for 2011–16); see also JENNIFER BARNES 
BOWIE, DONALD R. SONGER & JOHN SZMER, THE VIEW FROM THE BENCH AND CHAMBERS 140 
(2014) (reporting dissent rates in the range of 8–12 percent for published decisions from the mid-
1970s to 2002). 
 166. See Christina L. Boyd, Opinion Writing in the Federal District Courts, 36 JUST. SYS. J. 
254, 261–62 (2015) (reporting that 9 percent of the cases in her database yielded at least 1 opinion 
available on Lexis); Hoffman et al., supra note 124, at 693, 751 (reporting that 18 percent of the 
district-court cases in their database resulted in an opinion available on Lexis or Westlaw); Peter 
Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published 
and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1138, 1143 
(1990) (reporting that about 15 percent of employment-discrimination cases in their sample 
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But in the matched corpus, there is a reasoned opinion from the district 
court for the large majority of the cases, most commonly an 
unpublished opinion available through Westlaw or Lexis. Indeed, more 
than 10 percent of the cases in the matched corpus had district-court 
opinions published in the Federal Supplement or the other official West 
reporters (Federal Rules Decisions and Bankruptcy Reporter). This 
publication rate far exceeds the usual rate at which cases in the district 
courts generate officially published opinions.167 These are the apples 
from the lower-court basket, in other words. 
Once the matched-corpus database was assembled, it was 
searched for canons and other interpretive tools. Given the smaller 
number of cases and the opportunity for more fine-grained scrutiny, 
the matched-corpus analysis was able to include some tools, such as the 
common law, that were too difficult to locate reliably when relying only 
on large-n, electronic searches. As elsewhere, cases are counted as 
citing a canon even when the canon appears in a concurrence or 
dissent, and citations are counted regardless of how much weight the 
canon is ultimately given.168 Citations that merely describe what 
another court did, however, are excluded, as are those that involve the 
interpretation of non-statutory texts. 
Tables 2 and 3 present results for those tools that appeared more 
than 10 times in the Supreme Court opinions.169 To use linguistic 
canons for purposes of exposition, Table 2 shows that those canons 
were used in 16 of the 218 Supreme Court opinions, but those canons 
appeared in only 9 of the court of appeals decisions. All of the tools 
 
resulted in an opinion available on Lexis). 
 167. It is difficult to calculate publication rates for district courts because a case may present 
several opportunities for a published opinion, such as rulings on dispositive motions, post-trial 
motions, and remands after appeal. By the same token, cases in the district court may present no 
opportunities for a published opinion, as when a case quickly settles. Probably fewer than 5 
percent of district-court cases yield any published opinion. See Boyd, supra note 166, at 262 
(reporting that 9 percent of the cases in the data set had a written opinion, of which only slightly 
over a third—a total of about 3 percent—were published). 
 168. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining why this Article does not make judgments about the 
weight of an opinion’s reliance on particular canons). As before, these search terms are on file 
with the author. 
 169. The canons that returned fewer than 10 results include the presumptions against 
preemption, retroactivity, extraterritoriality, and implied repeal; the state-sovereignty clear-
statement rule; in pari materia; and “no elephants in mouseholes.” For legislative history and 
deference regimes, the table includes a composite category as well as subcategories, even though 
some subcategories did not have more than 10 appearances. The category for committee reports 
includes conference committees. Lenity is included in Table 3 because it had more than 10 results 
in the larger corpus reflected in Table 2. 
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were, to varying degrees, less prevalent in the lower-court corpus. This 
again supports the hypothesis that Supreme Court decisions are more 
interpretively rich. Here, the effect persists even within the same cases. 
 
Table 2: Frequency of Tool Use in the Supreme Court/Court of 
Appeals Matched Corpus (n = 218 Supreme Court opinions with 
matched court of appeals opinions) 
 
Supreme Ct. 
cases 
Ct. Appeals 
cases170 
Matched sets 
Dictionary 79 34.5 24 
Any legislative history 80 59 30 
     Congressional Record      25      18      6 
     Committee Reports      66      55.5      23.5 
     Hearings      23      10      2 
Surplusage/superfluity 42 25 8 
Any deference regime 32 26 17 
    Auer/Seminole Rock      5      6      3 
     Chevron      22      22      14 
     Skidmore      13      7      3 
Consistent usage/ 
meaningful variation 
28 13.5 6.5 
Common law 24 13.5 7 
Absurd results 21 19 3 
Const. avoidance 20 8 5 
Linguistic canons 16 9 4 
Lenity 12 3 1 
 
Although there are substantial hierarchical divergences in 
interpretive complexity even within the matched corpus, it is worth 
noting that some of the gaps are narrower in the matched corpus than 
they are in the broader universe of all decisions. Recall from Table 1 
 
 170. Fractional citations are reported when one decision reviews multiple separate cases from 
the lower court and only some of the lower-court cases use the tool. 
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that citations to congressional hearings and the Congressional Record 
are extremely rare in the lower courts. Here we see that they are much 
more prevalent in the matched corpus. The data do not explain why. 
Since the matched corpus contains a disproportionate share of the 
hardest cases, it makes sense that courts would turn to more difficult 
and less authoritative sources for guidance. It is also possible that 
courts and attorneys realize that the case is a good candidate for 
certiorari and therefore engage in more exhaustive analysis. 
The matched-corpus method also reveals whether the same tools 
are being used in the same cases at each level. A “matched set,” as 
reported in the far-right column, occurs when the same tool is used at 
both levels in the very same case. The tool with the best matching 
performance in the corpus was deference, Chevron in particular. But 
the general conclusion is that matches are rare. For example, of the 16 
Supreme Court cases using a linguistic canon, the corresponding court 
of appeals used a linguistic canon in only 4 of them.171 The most 
common reason for a failed match is that a tool appeared for the first 
time in the Supreme Court. Recall Yates v. United States,172 the 
undersized-fish case described in the Introduction. The Supreme Court 
used, among other tools, a bevy of textual canons (ejusdem generis, 
noscitur a sociis, and antisurplusage), the Congressional Record, and 
the statute’s heading, none of which were found in the court of appeals’ 
decision. The only matches across the two iterations of Yates, among 
the tools studied here, were use of the dictionary and the rule of lenity. 
The hierarchical disparities in canon frequency are even wider 
when one looks at the district courts. Table 3 presents the same kind of 
analysis as the previous table, but it includes only those Supreme Court 
cases in which a corresponding district-court decision existed and could 
be found, which is about 80 percent of the cases. As Table 3 shows, 
most tools are used much more often at the Supreme Court level. Tools 
with particularly steep drop-offs include constitutional avoidance and 
the holistic rule of consistent usage and meaningful variation. The tools 
that come closest to parity are deference and legislative history, which 
the Supreme Court uses only about twice as often as the district court. 
In both instances, however, the picture becomes more complex when 
 
 171. Recall that the category of linguistic canons is a composite of ejusdem generis, noscitur a 
sociis, expressio unius, and the rule of the last antecedent. In each of the four matches, both courts 
used the same canon. For legislative history, a match occurs even if courts use different kinds of 
committee reports. To some degree this grouping overstates the low level of cross-tier matching.  
 172. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
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one disaggregates the tool into its different varieties. Within the 
category of legislative history, the use of committee reports is closest 
to parity, while the use of hearings and debates increases sharply as 
cases move up the appellate ladder. This finding reinforces the finding 
above173 that the lower courts, especially the district courts, tend to 
focus on the most accessible and most authoritative kinds of legislative 
history, while the Supreme Court is more willing to examine more 
obscure sources. 
  
 
 173. Supra Part II.C.2. 
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Table 3: Frequency of Tool Use in the Supreme Court/District-Court 
Matched Corpus (n = 173.5 Supreme Court opinions with 
matched district-court opinions174) 
 Supreme Ct. 
cases 
District Ct. 
cases 
Matched sets 
Dictionary 66 14.5 12 
Any legislative history 63 27.5 15.5 
     Congressional Record      22      4.5      3.5 
     Committee Reports      50      25      11 
     Hearings      18      1      0 
Surplusage/superfluity 35 7 6 
Any deference regime 25 10 7 
     Auer/Seminole Rock      5      2.5      2.5 
     Chevron      15      8      5 
     Skidmore      12      2.5      1 
Consistent usage/ 
meaningful variation 
22 1 0 
Common law 15 2 1 
Absurd results 15 5 3 
Const. avoidance 15 1 0 
Linguistic canons 14 2 0 
Lenity 6 1 1 
 
As Table 3 also shows, the number of matched sets—that is, 
instances in which the same canon is used in the same case in the district 
court and Supreme Court—is staggeringly low for most tools. For the 
cases in which the Supreme Court ultimately used a linguistic canon, a 
legislative hearing, or the avoidance canon (14, 18, and 15 Supreme 
Court cases, respectively), the district courts had used those tools in 
none of the same cases. I would not have expected such a high degree 
 
 174. The number of Supreme Court opinions includes half a case because in one of the 
Supreme Court decisions reviewing two separate cases, only one of the district-court cases had an 
opinion. 
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of methodological discontinuity within cases. This discontinuity raises 
rule-of-law concerns about predictability, as explored further below.175 
Even the matched-corpus method overstates, to a degree, the 
similarity between courts. Litigation typically narrows in scope as it 
moves up the appellate pyramid. In a complicated case, the district 
court might resolve dozens of contested matters, but only a few of those 
rulings are challenged in the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court 
ordinarily addresses only one of them.176 The matched corpus includes 
only the opinion from the lower court that addresses the eventual 
certiorari issue, not any other opinions in the case. But some of the 
included opinions discussed multiple issues, including multiple 
interpretive issues, besides the certiorari issue.177 I did not excise the 
portions of the opinion dealing with other questions. If the lower-court 
corpus were restricted to only the parts of the decisions discussing the 
certiorari issue, the lower-court portion of the corpus would be even 
more canon poor than it is now.178 
A final comment on the matched corpus concerns unpublished 
decisions. The difference between the published and unpublished court 
of appeals decisions in the corpus is stark. In the unpublished opinions, 
interpretive tools other than precedent are almost entirely absent. The 
large majority of the unpublished decisions were short and relied on 
precedent, most often circuit precedent. At the district-court level, 
tools other than precedent were less common in unpublished decisions, 
but the distinction between the two types of opinions was not nearly so 
dramatic. That the unpublished opinions of the courts of appeals are so 
interpretively impoverished likely reflects the fact that the courts of 
appeals unilaterally control publication status, use different processes 
for the two types of opinions, and give them entirely different 
precedential status.179 
 
 175. Infra Part II.G. 
 176. A counterexample is Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., where the Supreme Court 
ordered reargument to address a new question not litigated below. 569 U.S. 108, 114 (2013). This 
is rare, because the usual rule is that a reviewing court does not consider new issues. 
 177. An extreme example is Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 109 (2013), in which the 
Supreme Court considered only one question about conspiracy law, while the court of appeals 
had issued a lengthy opinion that discussed more than 20 constitutional, statutory, procedural, 
and evidentiary matters. United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 178. Trimming the lower-court opinions would also affect the amount of matching. It would 
slightly reduce the number of cases in which a canon used below disappeared when the case 
reached the Supreme Court. It would slightly increase the number of cases in which new canons 
showed up for the first time in the Supreme Court. 
 179. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/26/2018  10:39 AM 
2018] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 55 
E. Comparing Textualist Trends at All Three Levels 
Interpretive approaches need not remain static over time. They 
can change, both in terms of the theoretical goal of interpretation and 
in terms of the particular tools that are most important. One notable 
shift is that the Supreme Court’s interpretive tools are more textualist 
in orientation today than they were several decades ago.180 This section 
considers whether the lower courts, especially the vastly understudied 
district courts, also underwent a textualist shift. The period under study 
for this section is 1975 to 2016. 
As stated above, interpretive approaches are distinguished in 
practice by which interpretive tools they emphasize.181 Probably the 
most readily apparent feature of the new textualism championed by 
Justice Scalia and others is its extreme skepticism toward the use of 
legislative history.182 The aversion toward legislative history is matched 
with a preference for text-based interpretive tools, including whole-act 
arguments and linguistic canons.183 
Previous work has shown that the federal courts of appeals shifted 
toward at least some textualist tools over the last several decades. In 
particular, the courts of appeals started to increase their use of 
linguistic canons around 1990, and as a result, they use such canons 
about twice as often today as they did 30 years ago.184 That pattern 
roughly matched a similar trend in the Supreme Court, though the 
Supreme Court’s increase apparently started a few years earlier and 
 
 180. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 133, at 592–93; Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of 
Justice Scalia and His Textualist Ideal, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2017). This is not to say 
that the Court today is full of committed textualists. On the contrary, the Court as a whole did 
not adopt Justice Scalia’s boldest theoretical propositions, and it may be that the most significant 
recent development in Supreme Court statutory interpretation is a textualist-purposive synthesis 
that has quieted the methodological battles. See id. at 859, 874; see also John F. Manning, The 
New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 113–82 (2011) (describing the development of a new, 
“textually structured” version of purposivism). Even if the textualist wave has crested, the Court 
is still more textualist today than it was 40 years ago, especially in terms of the tools that the Court 
emphasizes, which is the focus here. 
 181. Supra Part II.A. 
 182. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 29–30 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory 
Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60–66 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623–24, 650–56 (1990); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 
VA. L. REV. 347, 361–62 (2005). 
 183. See, e.g., United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 
365, 371 (1988) (making the now-famous statement that “[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic 
endeavor”); SCALIA, supra note 182, at 25–27; Eskridge, supra note 182, at 660–64. 
 184. CROSS, supra note 1, at 190–91; Bruhl, supra note 1, at 499–506. 
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was much steeper, such that the Court currently uses linguistic canons 
substantially more frequently than the courts of appeals.185 Something 
similar happened with dictionaries in recent decades; their use has 
increased dramatically in the Supreme Court and increased somewhat 
in the courts of appeals.186 Existing research also shows that the courts 
of appeals, over the same time period, reduced their use of legislative 
history.187 These changes—linguistic canons and dictionaries up, 
legislative history down—indicate a shift toward textualist 
methodology in the courts of appeals. 
In light of those findings, we might wonder how these changes 
affected the district courts. Did this same pattern occur in the district 
courts? If so, roughly when? And what about other indicators of 
textualism, like the whole-act rule? Did both published and 
unpublished opinions change? The short answer to those questions is 
that pro-textualist patterns exist at each level, though the textualist 
shift is less pronounced as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from 
the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. 
Further, the shift toward textualist tools was stronger in published 
opinions than in unpublished ones. 
This Section measures the rise of textualism at different levels of 
the judiciary over a period of 40 years by tracking patterns in the use 
of legislative history, linguistic canons, holistic-textual tools, and 
dictionaries. For purposes of this study, the use of legislative history is 
defined as citations to committee reports (including conference 
committees), the Congressional Record, and congressional hearings. 
There are other forms of legislative history, of course, but this list 
includes the most important category, namely committee reports, and 
all of the items on the list are particularly easy to identify through 
electronic searches. The category of linguistic canons is composed of 
four familiar rules of word association and grammar: ejusdem generis, 
noscitur a sociis, expressio unius, and the rule of the last antecedent. 
All of these linguistic canons can be captured with good accuracy 
through electronic searches. The search for holistic-textual tools is 
meant to capture a set of canons that encourage courts to draw 
inferences from the whole act or even other statutes, namely the rule 
 
 185. Bruhl, supra note 1, at 499–506.  
 186. Brudney & Baum, Dictionaries 2.0, supra note 159, at 105; John Calhoun, Note, 
Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 
124 YALE L.J. 484, 497–502 (2014). 
 187. CROSS, supra note 1, at 183–87; Parrillo, supra note 121, at 389. 
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of consistent usage and meaningful variation,188 the in pari materia 
canon, and the rule against surplusage. These holistic-textual tools are 
a bit harder to search for, and the search terms are likely 
underinclusive, but that should be true across courts and time periods. 
Dictionaries include both legal and general dictionaries. For each tool, 
the searches are intended to capture their use in statutory 
interpretation while excluding uses in other contexts like contract 
interpretation (which is common in the lower courts’ diversity docket) 
or constitutional interpretation. 
The following figures present the results for the period spanning 
from 1975 to 2016. For each court, there are markers showing the 
citation rate for each year and a smoothed curve that is meant to ease 
visualization by showing the trend over time.189 The curve for the 
Supreme Court is thicker to visually signal the greater variability in the 
Court’s annual rates, which stems from the Court’s small docket size. 
The figures separately display published and unpublished district-court 
decisions. Unpublished decisions from the courts of appeals are 
omitted throughout this Section because they very rarely include any 
of the tools at issue. Note that the vertical scales of the figures differ, 
as some of the tools are more prevalent than others. 
Figure 4 shows legislative history, the tool most disfavored by 
textualists. Previous work has traced the use of legislative history by 
the Supreme Court and, to a much lesser degree, the courts of 
appeals.190 This study brings in the district courts and compares their 
practices to those of the higher courts. As Figure 4 shows, the use of 
legislative history reached a recent peak at all three levels in the mid- 
to late-1980s and has declined since then. The citation rate is 
substantially higher in the Supreme Court, but the trends are parallel 
across all three levels. 
 
 
 188. This canon instructs that the same language in different sections or statutes should be 
given the same meaning, and different language given different meaning. 
 189. The smoothed lines in the figures reflect locally weighted regressions (known as 
LOWESS or LOESS) calculated with a modest smoothing factor of 0.33. See WILLIAM S. 
CLEVELAND, THE ELEMENTS OF GRAPHING DATA 168–72 (rev. ed. 1994) (describing the 
technique). LOWESS smoothing can be performed with statistics packages or an Excel add-in.  
 190. For the Supreme Court, see, for example, Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s 
Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 369, 384–87 (1999); Law & Zaring, supra note 93, at 1716 fig.5. For studies of the courts of 
appeals, in some cases with comparisons to the Supreme Court, see, for example, CROSS, supra 
note 1, at 183–87; Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 700–11; 
Parrillo, supra note 121, at 365–66. 
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Figure 4: Use of Legislative History in Different Courts, Annual 
Citation Rates and Trends, 1975–2016 
 
The next several figures show the use of the three tools favored by 
textualists, namely dictionaries, holistic-textual tools, and linguistic 
canons. At the start of the period under study, all three courts used 
these tools at similar rates. In the Supreme Court, the use of all three 
tools began to increase in the 1980s, though the variability in the yearly 
data makes it hard to pinpoint the precise turning point. The Court’s 
citation rate is now much higher than it was several decades ago. The 
increase is also present in the lower courts’ published opinions, but it 
was not as sharp and perhaps started a bit later. Within the lower 
courts, the increase was larger for the courts of appeals than for the 
district courts. 
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Figure 5: Use of Dictionaries in Different Courts, Annual Citation Rates 
and Trends, 1975–2016 
 
 
Figure 6: Use of Holistic-Textual Canons, Annual Citation Rates and 
Trends, 1975–2016 
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Figure 7: Use of Linguistic Canons, Annual Citation Rates and Trends, 
1975–2016191 
 
In the district courts, the increase in the use of textualist-oriented 
tools manifested itself in published opinions, but the citation rate in the 
unpublished opinions, which are much more numerous, was essentially 
flat for 40 years. This divergence between published and unpublished 
opinions requires some comment. First, recall that district-court 
decisions are selected for publication when the authoring judges and 
West’s attorneys believe that they have broad significance.192 The 
results show that the important decisions—those that address questions 
of first impression, for example—use textualist tools more than they 
used to. Second, although the citation rates in unpublished opinions 
remained fairly steady, the raw numbers of uses of the canons did 
increase a great deal over time. The rate remained steady because the 
denominator—that is, the number of unpublished interpretive 
decisions available through Westlaw—increased sharply from about 
300 in 1980 to over 12,000 for each of the last several years. The district 
courts are busier than they used to be, but most of that massive increase 
in the denominator reflects the fact that a greater proportion of their 
decisions now make their way to Westlaw.193 To be included in my 
 
 191. For the sake of visualization, the figure omits the 2013 data point for the Supreme Court, 
which is an outlier at 13 percent. It was included when calculating the trendline. 
 192. Supra text accompanying note 105. 
 193. See supra note 128 (describing a huge jump in the number of unpublished decisions 
around 2005). 
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denominator, a decision must include at least some discussion of 
statutory interpretation.194 Nonetheless, it may be that Westlaw’s more 
capacious collection methods mean that the average unpublished 
interpretive decision on Westlaw today is less complicated than the 
average unpublished interpretive decision on Westlaw from the past.195 
If that is so, then it may be that Westlaw’s more exhaustive collection 
methods are masking an increased propensity over time to cite 
textualist tools in otherwise similarly significant unpublished opinions. 
Similar forces could make the drop in the use of legislative history in 
unpublished decisions look somewhat more pronounced than it really 
is. 
The focus of this study is how interpretation differs across courts, 
not causal mechanisms, but it is natural to speculate about what caused 
the textualist shift seen above. Were the lower courts responding to 
changes at the Supreme Court, or more specifically to Justice Scalia’s 
crusade against legislative history on and off the bench? Does the 
credit go to President Reagan’s picks for the lower courts and his 
Department of Justice’s textualist litigation strategies?196 Were trends 
in the broader legal culture influencing all actors at once? One needs 
to be cautious in making causal claims. Nonetheless, the partisan 
makeup of the lower courts does not appear to explain the shift.197 
Reagan-appointed judges might explain the initial change, but the 
change persists in the Clinton and Obama eras. Textualism is a 
bipartisan phenomenon. Indeed, although this is anecdotal, some of 
the most text- and canon-heavy interpretive battles in the last few 
Supreme Court terms have involved duels between Democratic 
 
 194. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 195. To test that intuition, I compared the unpublished district-court cases in the denominator 
for 1990 and 2015 to see what proportion of those cases was made up of (1) pro se cases and (2) 
cases in which prisoners seek noncapital habeas relief or resentencing. Those are two categories 
particularly likely to involve settled law or frivolous claims. Cf. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004 
DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY 5 tbl.1 (2005) (assigning very low workload 
weightings to noncapital habeas and resentencing proceedings). The 2015 cases contained much 
higher proportions of both kinds of cases. 
 196. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION i, v (1989) (casting doubt on the validity of legislative history as 
an interpretive source). 
 197. See CROSS, supra note 1, at 185–86 (showing that the periods with more heavily 
Republican courts of appeals do not closely align with the periods of increasing textualism); see 
also Gluck & Posner, supra note 1, at 1311–12 (reporting that younger judges were more canon 
oriented and formalist than older judges, regardless of their appointing president). 
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appointees.198 
Subject to confirmation and refinement by other evidence, the 
results above support at least three tentative conclusions. First, the 
lower courts generally paralleled the Supreme Court in deemphasizing 
legislative history and increasing their use of linguistic and holistic-
textual canons and dictionaries. Second, the changes in the lower 
courts were not as dramatic in magnitude.199 Whatever its shifting 
fortunes in the Supreme Court, textualism did not conquer the lower 
courts. Third, the use of legislative history and characteristically 
textualist canons is highest by far in the Supreme Court and lowest in 
the district courts and, within the district courts, lower in their 
unpublished opinions than in their published opinions. This last cross-
tier disparity once again supports the general hypothesis that lower 
courts’ interpretive approaches are simpler in that all tools of 
interpretation, besides precedent, would appear less often. 
F. The Lifecycle of a Federalism Canon 
Some canons may be timeless, or at least old enough and Latin 
sounding enough that they seem timeless. But other canons have been 
born within living memory. The phenomenon of interest here is the 
“digestion” of a new canon through the judicial system—that is, the 
way a canon begins at the top of the judicial hierarchy and then diffuses 
through the system. 
It is hard to identify clear breaks in interpretive rules that could 
be used to test the digestion hypothesis. Probably the best modern 
candidate is the Rehnquist Court’s creation of powerful federalism 
clear-statement rules out of what had previously been presumptions 
against preemption and interference with state sovereignty.200 Some 
invocations of the federalism clear-statement rules are hard to pin 
down, as they can blend into ordinary preemption at the margins. For 
 
 198. E.g., Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016) (dueling opinions from Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (dueling opinions from 
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan); see also Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture, at min. 18 (Nov. 17, 
2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation 
[https://perma.cc/ND8F-QSJD] (describing herself as a textualist). 
 199. This finding aligns with other dictionary studies, which found that the Supreme Court’s 
affection for dictionaries far outstrips the lower courts’ use of that source. Supra note 186 and 
accompanying text (discussing findings of Brudney, Baum, and Calhoun). 
 200. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 619–29 (1992) (discussing 
the development of these canons). 
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the sake of reliable searching, this Section focuses on one precisely 
definable version of the canon, which governs federal statutes that 
abrogate state sovereign immunity.201 It is likely that some other canons 
would display similar dynamics. 
The data provide some support for the digestion hypothesis, as 
Figure 8 shows. The bars in the figure show the number of times the 
Supreme Court used the canon each year.202 The Supreme Court issued 
a burst of decisions using the state-sovereignty canon around 1990, but 
the Court’s use of the canon was already declining by the time its use 
peaked in the lower courts around a decade later. During those peak 
years in the lower courts, the canon was more common in published 
opinions than in unpublished ones, which is what one would expect. 
Today, the canon has a strange citation profile, as the canon is 
especially prominent in unpublished district-court decisions. This 
pattern is consistent with a scenario in which the Supreme Court’s 
actions initially generate a need for novel applications and refinements 
of the canon, and then the canon becomes more routine and hemmed 
in by precedents. 
 
 
 201. E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (stating that “Congress 
may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by 
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute”). 
 202. The number of Supreme Court citations is used instead of rates for two reasons. First, 
one cannot present a very meaningful annual rate given the small numbers involved. Second, for 
the lower-court judges observing the Supreme Court’s work, it is not clear whether citation rates 
or raw numbers are more salient. 
Because the Supreme Court data in Figure 8 are expressed in raw numbers, this figure 
cannot be used to compare the rate at which the Supreme Court cites the canon against the rates 
at which the lower courts cite it. Citation rates and ratios can be compared using Figures 1–3 
above. Over the last decade, the Court’s overall citation rate is higher than the citation rates in 
the lower courts, though not vastly so. 
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Figure 8: Use of State-Sovereignty Canon in Different Courts, 1980–
2016203
 
G. Summary of Key Findings 
It is time to summarize the key findings from the analyses above, 
discuss their implications, and compare the results to the predictions 
from Part I. 
When it comes to statutory interpretation, the lower courts—
especially the district courts—are both doing different things than the 
Supreme Court and doing things differently. They do different things 
in that the lower courts rarely encounter the difficult interpretive 
questions of first impression that the Supreme Court regularly 
confronts. Therefore, it is not surprising that virtually all of the 
interpretive tools of first impression—legislative history, linguistic 
inferences, substantive canons, and the rest—appeared far less often in 
the lower courts. The paucity of canons is especially pronounced in 
their unpublished opinions. But even when courts at different levels do 
confront similar cases, as in the matched-corpus study, lower courts still 
behave differently in several respects. We repeatedly see, for one thing, 
that their interpretive methods remain simpler in that fewer tools, aside 
 
 203. To ease visualization, the citation rates are displayed using LOWESS smoothing with the 
smoothing parameter set to 0.33. See supra note 189 (describing the LOWESS technique). 
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from precedent, are used at lower levels of the judicial system. 
In addition to differing in how intensively they use interpretive 
tools overall, courts also differ with respect to which tools are most and 
least common at different levels of the system. To generalize, the more 
complicated the canon, the more overrepresented it is likely to be in 
the Supreme Court’s opinions. For example, several holistic-
interpretation canons are highly overrepresented in the Supreme 
Court; these include the presumptions of consistent usage and 
meaningful variation, the presumption against implied repeal, and the 
“no elephants in mouseholes” rule. By contrast, some of the traditional 
substantive canons and presumptions—which operate as handy judicial 
shortcuts—are relatively well represented in the lower courts.204 
Legislative history falls near the middle, but courts differ in how often 
they use different types of legislative history. All courts use committee 
reports the most, but the Supreme Court, unlike the lower courts, 
makes substantial use of less accessible and authoritative forms as 
well.205 
The most top-heavy canon in the study—that is, the one most 
overrepresented in the Supreme Court as compared to lower courts—
is the “no elephants in mouseholes” canon. Several different drivers of 
divergence all push this canon toward top-heaviness. To begin with, 
although the idea behind the canon appeals to timeless common sense, 
the named canon is fairly new.206 As a result, the lower courts and 
attorneys were still learning about it during the study period.207 But 
even aside from its novelty, other features of the canon suggest that it 
will remain particularly top-heavy. The canon is complex in that it 
requires an assessment of the importance of one statutory provision as 
measured against the goals of the larger regulatory regime of which it 
is a part. And as a tool that applies paradigmatically to major disputes 
in administrative law, the opportunities to use it increase, relative to 
caseload, as one climbs the judicial hierarchy. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the canon calling for narrow 
interpretations of jurisdictional statutes is extremely bottom-heavy. 
Although it is one of the most commonly used canons in the lower 
federal courts, it is not very common in the modern Supreme Court. 
Perhaps for that reason, this canon is also relatively unknown to 
 
 204. Supra Part II.C fig.2. 
 205. Supra Part II.C.2. 
 206. Its first appearance was in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 207. See Bruhl, supra note 1, at 543–45 (describing the early spread of the canon). 
BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/26/2018  10:39 AM 
66  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1 
legislation scholars, drawing much less scholarly attention than the top-
heavy elephant canon.208 The jurisdiction canon’s extraordinary 
bottom-heaviness is largely attributable to structural factors like 
limited appeal opportunities and the Supreme Court’s discretionary 
docket. Some of the disparity may also reflect divergent preferences: 
the lower courts have caseload-lightening reasons to narrow access to 
federal courts, while the current Supreme Court may favor broad 
federal jurisdiction so that it can expand its menu of certiorari petitions 
or increase federal control over wayward state courts.209 
Over time, the lower courts’ interpretive practices generally shift 
in line with trends in the Supreme Court’s practices, but not perfectly. 
Sometimes there are lags as new developments, such as the Rehnquist 
Court’s new federalism canons, diffuse through the system. Further, 
the textualist turn that started in the mid-1980s—one of the most 
significant changes in the Supreme Court’s interpretive practices—was 
less drastic at each step down in the judicial system. To be sure, the 
lower courts now use legislative history much less than they did in the 
mid-1980s.210 Yet we now have robust evidence that the Supreme 
Court’s contemporaneous big shift toward textualist tools—linguistic 
canons, holistic-textual inferences, and dictionaries—was more muted 
in the lower courts, especially in the district courts.211 This finding 
broadly coheres with Brudney and Baum’s conclusion that the lower 
courts’ interpretive methods remain eclectic as compared to the 
dictionary-obsessed monoculture toward which the Supreme Court 
sometimes seems headed.212 
These results require us to qualify some noteworthy recent 
scholarly findings that were based on Supreme Court practice. For 
example, Eskridge and Baer found that the Supreme Court’s cases 
involving deference to agency interpretations frequently cite amicus 
briefs filed by agencies and the Solicitor General.213 Further, they 
found that the government has a very high win rate in such cases, which 
is surprising given the informality of that form of agency 
 
 208. Compare Bruhl, supra note 1, at 542–46 (describing the rise and crystallization of the 
elephant canon), with Bruhl, supra note 89, at 504 (noting that the jurisdiction canon has 
“escape[d] the notice of Supreme Court-oriented scholarship”). 
 209. Id. at 553–55. 
 210. Supra Part II.E fig.4. 
 211. Supra Part II.E figs.5, 6 & 7; see also sources cited supra note 186 (previous studies of the 
use of dictionaries by the Supreme Court and courts of appeals). 
 212. Brudney & Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 687–89, 752. 
 213. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 83, at 1098–99, 1111–15. 
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interpretation.214 The results above show that lower courts rarely cite 
such briefs, likely because such briefs are so rarely available at earlier 
stages of litigation. The fact that the Supreme Court relies on agency 
interpretations that did not exist at the time of the lower court’s 
decision raises normative questions about whether it is appropriate for 
the universe of admissible interpretive materials to expand after a 
grant of certiorari.215 
Recent work on the Roberts Court by Anita Krishnakumar shows 
that substantive canons are used rather little compared to other tools,216 
but the results from the lower courts reveal a more complicated 
picture. The avoidance canon is indeed rare in lower courts for reasons 
discussed above,217 but several of the substantive presumptions—
against retroactivity, against extraterritoriality, against federal 
jurisdiction, and against abrogation of state immunity—are 
overrepresented in the district courts, the courts of appeals, or both.218 
In part, this difference is due to the lower courts’ diversity docket. 
Several of the traditional substantive canons—such as the presumption 
against retroactivity—have state-law cognates that are employed with 
some frequency by the lower federal courts. It is also worth noting that 
the chief users of some substantive canons, including the state-
sovereignty clear-statement rule, vary over time. The Roberts Court 
has been a quiet period for federalism canons compared to the 
Rehnquist Court, but lower courts still spend some time working 
through the federalism canons’ implications.219 
The study also highlights yet another complexity in courts’ 
statutory-interpretation practices. Everyone knows that interpretive 
practices are far from uniform.220 The matched-corpus study shows that 
different canons are often invoked within the same case as it moves 
through the judicial system.221 Usually that is because the Supreme 
Court’s opinion introduces tools not used below, though sometimes 
tools used below disappear as the case progresses. This discontinuity 
 
 214. Id. at 1143–44. 
 215. See Bruhl, supra note 22, at 463–65. 
 216. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 825 
(2017); see also id. at 893–95 (reporting that the Supreme Court, from 2006 to 2012, used language 
canons more often than substantive canons). 
 217. Supra Part II.C.3. 
 218. Supra Part II.C.4. 
 219. Supra Part II.F. 
 220. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
 221. Supra Part II.D. 
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threatens the hope that the canons, while rarely outcome 
determinative, can at least form a more or less reliable “interpretive 
regime.” As Eskridge and Frickey wrote, 
An interpretive regime tells lower court judges, agencies, and citizens 
how strings of words in statutes will be read, what presumptions will 
be entertained as to statutes’ scope and meaning, and what auxiliary 
materials might be consulted to resolve ambiguities . . . . [B]y 
rendering statutory interpretation more predictable, regular, and 
coherent, interpretive regimes can contribute to the rule of law.222 
Even if there is a somewhat reliable interpretive regime at the 
Supreme Court level, the matched-corpus results show that there may 
not be a predictable regime across courts, even within the life of given 
case. In addition, this discontinuity may reinforce the growth of the 
specialist Supreme Court bar composed of attorneys who know the 
Court’s interpretive language.223 
A relative bright spot in terms of predictability is the Chevron 
doctrine of deference to agency interpretation. Of all the tools under 
study, it had the highest rate of matched sets. A potential explanation 
is that Chevron provides a relatively straightforward, universally 
known framework for analysis in agency cases. It can serve this 
function of structuring argument whether or not it predictably dictates 
results, and indeed the framework’s ability to accommodate pro- and 
anti-agency rulings may contribute to its prevalence.224 
III.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS: WHAT 
INTERPRETIVE DIVERGENCE MEANS FOR SCHOLARS, COURTS, 
TEACHERS, AND ADVOCATES 
The results described above reveal a degree of divergence in the 
interpretive methods used at different levels of the federal judiciary. 
Lower courts use almost all the interpretive tools, apart from 
precedent, less than the Supreme Court. More interestingly, courts 
 
 222. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66 (1994). 
 223. See generally Lazarus, supra note 37 (observing the growing dominance of the Supreme 
Court bar). 
 224. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Legal Framework, JOTWELL (Oct. 24, 2017) 
(reviewing Kristin Hickman & Nicholas R. Bednar, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 5 (2017)), https://adlaw.jotwell.com/chevron-as-a-legal-framework [https://perma.cc/N52H-
2597] (describing Chevron as a doctrinal and rhetorical framework that serves a coordinating 
function of “provid[ing] a common language” for the articulation of competing perspectives). 
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emphasize different tools. The tip of the iceberg, the Supreme Court, 
is not representative of the whole. 
This Article’s findings have implications for several audiences. 
These findings can help scholars evaluate normative prescriptions and 
identify future lines of research. The findings might suggest that the 
Supreme Court and other courts should change their practices. The 
findings are also useful for advocates and their professors. The 
following pages address the implications of interpretive divergence for 
each of those audiences. 
A. Implications for Scholars 
The findings presented above provide a basis for assessing 
normative prescriptions aimed at the lower courts. I argued in previous 
work that lower courts should use simpler methods of statutory 
interpretation than the Supreme Court in recognition of their 
institutional constraints, which include the need to handle more cases 
in less time and with weaker briefing.225 That recommendation to 
simplify means, among other things, that the lower courts should rely 
less on complicated whole-code structural arguments and legislative 
history and rely more on other decisionmakers like higher courts and 
administrative agencies.226 The results here, together with other 
research, show that the lower courts follow these recommendations in 
several respects. The lower courts rely heavily on precedent, including 
nonbinding dicta,227 and they also use the Chevron deference doctrine 
regularly and probably more faithfully than the Supreme Court.228 The 
lower courts engage in complicated holistic-textual analysis relatively 
rarely.229 
The aspect of lower-court interpretation that does not fit my 
previous normative prescription as well is their use of legislative 
history, which remains high in absolute terms, though only about half 
 
 225. Bruhl, supra note 22, at 470, 494–95. 
 226. Id. at 474–84; see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 1 (2006) (arguing from institutional 
premises that all courts should use simple interpretive methods). 
 227. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.C.3 and text accompanying note 179; see also Neal Devins & 
David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 597, 610, 613 (2017) 
(showing that district courts now cite precedent, especially circuit precedent, much more heavily 
and deferentially than they did in the past). 
 228. See supra Part II.C figs.1 & 2; see also Barnett & Walker, supra note 107, at 3–6 (arguing 
that the courts of appeals take Chevron more seriously than the Supreme Court does). 
 229. Supra Parts II.C, II.D tbl.3. 
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as frequent as it used to be.230 A closer look, however, shows that the 
lower courts’ use of legislative history is, even more than the Supreme 
Court’s, heavily tilted toward committee reports rather than floor 
debates or legislative hearings.231 This makes sense because piecing 
together a patchwork of speeches, colloquies, and witness statements 
into a probative picture of a statute’s intent is a particularly tall order 
for pinched lower courts.232 It is an important open question whether 
the dominance of committee reports will and should persist in an era 
of unorthodox lawmaking characterized by omnibus legislation, 
emergency legislation, and massive last-minute amendments—a world 
in which committee reports are less valuable, when they even exist.233 
Justice Jackson’s “committee reports only” compromise234 seems 
increasingly impracticable. 
These findings also have implications for the scholarly movement 
for methodological stare decisis. The conventional view is that 
interpretive methodology does not receive ordinary stare decisis effect, 
but some scholars advocate changing that.235 Even in the absence of a 
comprehensive, well-established system of methodological stare 
decisis, the results here show that the lower courts still respond to, or 
at least roughly parallel, the interpretive practices and shifts of the 
Supreme Court.236 But if the federal judicial system is quasi-
precedential already, then there is not much room for a formal 
precedential system to bring greater alignment. Furthermore, to the 
extent there are real differences across courts—and there certainly still 
are—those differences are not entirely traceable to the lack of a 
formalized system of precedent. They are, instead, at least partly the 
result of hardwired, structural features of the judicial system. That 
suggests that some meaningful amount of interpretive divergence is 
 
 230. Supra Part II.E fig.4. 
 231. Supra Part II.C.2. 
 232. Bruhl, supra note 22, at 474–76. 
 233. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox 
Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1799–1826 (2015) (summarizing 
the rise of various kinds of non-textbook lawmaking processes). 
 234. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1951) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 235. See, e.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory 
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1872–97 (2008); Gluck, supra note 1, at 1754, 
1765–66, 1848–55; Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of 
Stare Decisis As Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 705–08 (2008). 
 236. Supra Part II.E. 
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going to endure.237 
The centrality of precedent in the lower courts’ interpretive 
practices highlights the value of more work on that topic. Until 
recently, precedent’s role in the statutory-interpretation literature has 
been highly compartmentalized in that scholars have focused largely 
on the problem of when a court may overrule one of its own on-point 
precedents.238 Precedent did not have a place on the original version of 
Eskridge & Frickey’s iconic “funnel of abstraction,” which provides a 
structure for their account of eclectic interpretation.239 At the very 
bottom of the funnel, which is reserved for the most concrete and 
authoritative sources, is statutory text.240 Next is legislative history.241 
That arrangement of sources becomes more understandable when one 
recalls that the funnel was originally developed in an attempt to explain 
Supreme Court statutory interpretation.242 Recent iterations of the 
funnel now give a prominent place to precedent.243 Still, precedent 
plays many roles in statutory interpretation, especially in lower 
courts—binding authority, persuasive authority, a source of analogies, 
a source for authoritative statements of statutory purposes, a source 
for interpretive principles, and more.244 There is much to learn here. 
This Article’s findings suggest the value of additional research into 
the causes of interpretive divergence. The divergences revealed here 
likely have multiple sources, including differences in caseloads and 
docket compositions, judicial ideology, and decision-making 
structures. One particularly valuable effort would be to isolate the role 
of attorneys’ briefing practices in shaping the interpretive styles of 
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 238. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 
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stare decisis). 
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 242. Id. at 352–53 & n.123.  
 243. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 133, at 629–31; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
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various courts.245 In addition, it will be interesting to see whether the 
Supreme Court’s interpretive practices change in the post-Scalia era 
and, if so, whether lower courts follow. The lower courts did not shift 
as far toward textualism as the Supreme Court, and so one would 
expect modulated responses to potential future changes too. Above all, 
future Supreme Court–focused research should hesitate before 
assuming that its results generalize to other federal courts, let alone to 
state courts and other interpreters of law. 
B. Implications for Courts 
A question I can only raise but not resolve here is what the 
Supreme Court and other federal courts should do about interpretive 
divergence. One possibility is for the Supreme Court to try to reduce 
divergence by unifying its own practices, clarifying that its methods are 
binding on lower courts, and policing lower courts’ methodology. 
Another way to reduce divergence is for the Court to change its own 
practices so as to better match the practices of the far more numerous, 
and more constrained, lower courts. Those two alternatives could be 
characterized as leveling up and leveling down, respectively. A final 
alternative, of course, is to do nothing. That last option is appealing if 
one thinks that the interpretive system works decently enough despite 
divergence and that the potential for greater harmonization is limited. 
For the lower courts, the fact of interpretive divergence does not 
necessarily mean that they should change their behavior to more 
closely mirror the Supreme Court’s. Some differences across tiers of 
the judiciary result from the simple fact that the different courts are 
doing different things—that is, they are handling different types of 
cases. To the extent that they are also doing things differently even 
when handling similar cases, at least some of the difference stems from 
constraints of the institutional environment. Trying to mimic the 
Supreme Court’s interpretive practices may be a poor use of the lower 
courts’ limited resources. 
C. Implications for Advocates and Their Teachers 
“Know your audience” is good advice for attorneys, but at the 
same time this Article’s results do not necessarily mean that attorneys 
should take their audience’s interpretive practices as fixed. To be sure, 
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some interpretive divergences reflect docket composition or hardwired 
constraints. But courts also respond to what they get. Various holistic-
interpretation tools, for example, are highly top-heavy, but that may 
reflect the fact that attorneys are not making these arguments in district 
courts and busy judges do not unearth them on their own. If attorneys 
made more whole-code arguments to district courts, they would appear 
more often in the decisions. 
The reality of interpretive divergence suggests that professors 
should reorient their Legislation and Statutory Interpretation courses 
in certain respects, such as by shifting the emphasis given to various 
interpretive tools. To be clear, the mere fact that a canon appears much 
more often in the Supreme Court than in the lower courts does not 
mean it should be deemphasized in teaching. After all, some 
differences between courts are the result of attorneys’ litigation 
choices. For some tools, however, including many substantive canons, 
there are structural reasons for hierarchical differences in prevalence. 
The constitutional-avoidance and state-sovereignty canons have 
traditionally received heavy emphasis in Legislation courses,246 and 
they are indeed canons that students should know. But to prepare 
students for the interpretive practices of the lower courts, where most 
of the work is done, it is also important to study the presumption 
against preemption and the canon of construing federal jurisdiction 
narrowly, which is one of the most prevalent canons of all.247 In 
recognition of the diversity jurisdiction of the lower courts, not to 
mention the fact that state-court dockets dwarf federal-court dockets, 
students should also learn more about state interpretive approaches in 
the jurisdictions in which they are most likely to practice.248 Finally, 
although legislative history is less important than it used to be, it is still 
widely used throughout the federal judiciary. Law students should 
certainly be taught how to find legislative history and, more 
importantly, how to use it persuasively. 
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